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Essays
THE COMPETITIVE FOOD CONUNDRUM:
CAN GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS
IMPROVE SCHOOL FOOD?
ELLEN FRIED†
MICHELE SIMON††
The longer you can look back, the farther you can look forward.
—Winston Churchill

1

INTRODUCTION
Increasing concerns over children’s health have focused the
nation’s attention on what children are eating, especially in school.
According to federal statistics, between 1963 and 2004, obesity rates
quadrupled for children ages six to eleven, and rates tripled for
adolescents ages twelve to nineteen.2 This alarming trend continues,
with the latest data showing that more than one-third of American

Copyright © 2007 by Ellen Fried and Michele Simon.
† Adjunct Assistant Clinical Professor, New York University Dep’t of Nutrition, Food
Studies & Public Health. M.A., New York University; J.D., Fordham University Law School;
A.B., Barnard College (Columbia University).
†† Adjunct Assistant Professor, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
Research and Policy Director, Marin Institute. J.D., University of California, Hastings College
of the Law; M.P.H., Yale School of Medicine; B.S., Carnegie Mellon University. Special thanks
to Mark Hancock (Stanford Law School, Class of 2007) for his impeccable research assistance
on state laws and regulations.
1. Winston S. Churchill, Speech to the Royal College of Physicians (Mar. 2, 1944), in 7
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES 1897–1963, at 6895, 6897 (Robert Rhodes
James ed., 1974).
2. Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs.,
Quickstats: Prevalence of Overweight Among Children and Teenagers, by Age Group and
Selected Period—United States, 1963–2002, 54 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 194, 203
(2005).
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3
children—roughly nine million children over age six —are either
4
obese or at risk for becoming obese. Equally disturbing is the
increasing diagnosis of Type 2 diabetes (formerly called “adult5
onset”) in young people. For those born in 2000, the lifetime risk of
developing diabetes, barring major changes in diet and lifestyle, is 33
percent for males and 39 percent for females; it is even higher for
6
Hispanics. Because obesity and diabetes are linked to myriad health
problems in adulthood, prevention through ensuring proper eating
habits in early stages of life is critical.
Although the public is still divided over whether obesity is a
public health issue or personal problem, many people believe schools
carry a substantial burden of responsibility—just behind parents and
individuals—when it comes to addressing childhood obesity.7 This
belief is well justified. The National School Lunch Program (NSLP)
serves twenty-nine million school children every day and costs
American taxpayers more than $7 billion a year to provide
purportedly “nutritionally balanced” meals.8 Many students, however,
fill up on items such as soft drinks, chips, and cookies, which are high

3. INST. OF MED., CHILDHOOD OBESITY IN THE UNITED STATES: FACTS AND FIGURES 1
(2004), available at http://www.iom.edu/Object.File/Master/22/606/FINALfactsandfigures2.pdf
(“At present, approximately nine million children over 6 years of age are considered obese.”).
4. INST. OF MED., PROGRESS IN PREVENTING CHILDHOOD OBESITY: HOW DO WE
MEASURE UP? 24 (Jeffrey P. Koplan et al. eds., 2006), available at http://books.nap.edu/
openbook.php?record_id=11722&page=R1.
5. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., NATIONAL DIABETES FACT SHEET 1, available at http://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/pubs/
pdf/ndfs_2003.pdf. Diabetes is striking particularly hard among American Indians, African
Americans, and Hispanic/Latino youth populations. Id.
6. K.M. Venkat Narayan et al., Lifetime Risk for Diabetes Mellitus in the United States, 290
JAMA 1884, 1888 (2003).
7. RESEARCH!AMERICA, POLL: OBESITY 10 (2006), available at http://
www.researchamerica.org/polldata/2006/endocrinepoll.pdf (counting those who responded that
“some” or “a lot” of responsibility rested on the group in question); see also Press Release,
Harvard Forums on Health 3 (June 11, 2003), available at http://www.phsi.
harvard.edu/health_reform/harvard_forum_release.pdf (“Two-thirds of Americans believe
schools should play a major role in helping to fight the [childhood] obesity problem.”).
8. FOOD AND NUTRITION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH
PROGRAM 1, 3 (2006), available at http://www.fns.usda.gov/cnd/lunch/AboutLunch/NSLP
FactSheet.pdf. Although the nutritional composition of NSLP meals is improving, advocates
urge lower fat and sodium levels and recommend that the commodity foods fit dietary
guidelines issued by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Mary Story et al., The Role of Schools
in Obesity Prevention, FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 2006, at 109, 113. The School Breakfast
Program, also funded by the federal government but much smaller in size, falls outside the
scope of this Article.
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9
in added sugars, fats, calories, and sodium, but low in nutrition. Such
“junk foods” sold in vending machines, cafeteria à la carte lines,10 and
school stores are known as “competitive foods” because they
11
compete with federally funded meals. Although NSLP meals are
required to meet nutritional standards based upon recommendations
from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Dietary
Guidelines for Americans, which recommend limiting total fat to 35
percent of calories and limiting saturated fat to less than 10 percent of
calories,12 competitive foods are not.13 As awareness of the nutritional
14
wasteland in schools has increased, the scrutiny of unhealthy food
and beverages available in public schools has intensified and reignited
political firestorms all over the nation.15

9. A California survey found that, among responding school districts, 60 percent of all
food sales are à la carte items not covered by federal nutritional guidelines. PUB. HEALTH INST.,
THE 2003 CALIFORNIA HIGH SCHOOL FAST FOOD SURVEY 2, 5 (2004), available at
http://www.phi.org/pdf-library/fastfoodsurvey2003.pdf.
10. “À la carte” refers to individual food items sold outside the reimbursable school meal,
generally at mealtime.
11. 7 C.F.R. § 210.11(a)(1). Junk foods—officially, Foods of Minimal Nutritional Value
(FMNV)—are currently defined as foods that provide less than 5 percent of the Reference
Daily Intake (RDI) for eight specified nutrients per serving. 7 C.F.R. § 210.11(a)(2) (2006).
They include soda water, water ices, chewing gum, and certain candies, including gum drops,
jelly beans, and candy-coated popcorn. 7 C.F.R. pt. 210 app. B (2006).
12. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR AMERICANS 29–30 (2005),
available at http://www.cnpp.usda.gov/Publications/DietaryGuidelines/2005/2005DGPolicyDocu
ment.pdf.
13. NSLP guidelines require that school meals provide no more than 30 percent of calories
from fat and 10 percent of calories from saturated fat, and provide recommendations for
Vitamin A, Vitamin C, iron, calcium, and calories. 7 C.F.R. § 210.10(b) (2006).
14. A Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) survey found “a disturbing
picture of the widespread availability of foods and beverages high in fat, sodium, and added
sugars as [à] la carte choices, in vending machines, and in school stores.” Howell Wechsler et al.,
Food Service and Foods and Beverages Available at School: Results from the School Health
Policies and Programs Study, 71 J. SCH. HEALTH 313, 322 (2001). “Nutrition, health, and
education agencies and professional organizations are increasingly concerned about the
widespread availability of foods and beverages sold on school campuses that are not part of
federally regulated school meal programs.” Id. at 313.
15. Efforts to remove sugary snacks, beverages, and other low nutrition items periodically
garner local, state, and federal attention, sparking hot debate. See, e.g., Lee Austin, Pasadena
Restricts Candy Snacks, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1970, at SG_B1 (noting the ban of candy in the
Pasadena School District); Frances Cerra, Parents Close Tap on Soda in Westchester Schools
Menu, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1976, at 66 (highlighting efforts to remove artificial substances from
school lunch foods); Laura Shapiro, What’s in a Lunch?, NEWSWEEK, Summer 1991, at 66 (“For
today’s kids, a balanced meal means a Coke in one hand and a Twinkie in the other.”); Snack
Bar Enforced to Aid Diets, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1963, at WS1 (“The district is in the midst of a
controversial program to . . . ban . . . the sale of candy, soda pop and other confections in the
schools.”).
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Virtually all schools sell competitive foods. The overwhelming
majority of schools—nearly nine out of ten—sell food in cafeteria à la
17
carte lines, vending machines, and school stores. Although à la carte
18
lines sell a range of healthy and unhealthy foods, vending machines
19
contain mostly poor nutritional choices. School stores primarily sell
candy.20
With 83 percent of elementary schools, 97 percent of middle and
junior high schools, and 99 percent of high schools selling competitive
junk foods, the potential impact on children’s health is enormous.21
This is particularly true for adolescents who consume 35–40 percent
of their daily calories at school.22
As of the 2003–04 school year, 75 percent of high schools, 65
percent of middle schools, and 30 percent of elementary schools had
“pouring rights” contracts,23 agreements in which schools receive cash
and other incentives in return for granting exclusive beverage sales
rights to the benefactor. Beverages most commonly sold in schools, as
reported by the soft drink industry, are “non-diet soft drinks, juice
drinks, . . . sports drinks, and water.”24
Children’s health measures continue to worsen. Although obesity
was cited decades ago as a negative impact of competitive foods, the
25
focus was primarily centered on the epidemic of dental caries.

16. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-563, SCHOOL MEAL PROGRAMS:
COMPETITIVE FOODS ARE WIDELY AVAILABLE AND GENERATE SUBSTANTIAL REVENUES
FOR SCHOOLS 3 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05563.pdf.
17. Id.
18. See Story et al., supra note 8, at 115.
19. In the mid-1990s, the items most widely available in school vending machines were, in
descending order, imitation juice drinks, carbonated beverages, fruit juice, candy bars, cookies,
candy, cheese puffs, and potato chips. Mary Story et al., Availability of Foods in High Schools: Is
There a Cause for Concern?, 96 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS’N 123, 124 (1996).
20. Marianne B. Wildey et al., Fat and Sugar Levels Are High in Snacks Purchased from
Student Stores in Middle Schools, 100 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS’N 319, 321 (2000).
21. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 16, at 14.
22. Simone A. French et al., Food Environment in Secondary Schools: À La Carte, Vending
Machines, and Food Policies and Practices, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1161, 1161 (2003).
23. JOY JOHANSON ET AL., CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST & THE PUB. HEALTH
ADVOCACY INST., RAW DEAL: SCHOOL BEVERAGE CONTRACTS LESS LUCRATIVE THAN
THEY SEEM 4 (2006), available at http://www.cspinet.org/beveragecontracts.pdf.
24. Id. at 2.
25. See Vending Machine Competition with the National School Lunch Program: Hearings
Before the S. Select Comm. on Nutrition and Human Needs, 93d Cong. 34 (1973) (statement of
Dr. Robert I. Kaplan, Member, Am. Dental Ass’n Council on Dental Health) (“Dental disease
is . . . rampant everywhere in the United States. Of the various manifestations of dental disease,
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Diabetes has also become a significant health issue for children. A
2003 study found the prevalence of children overweight at the onset
26
of Type 1 diabetes had tripled from the 1980s to 1990s. This may
suggest that obesity is contributing to the rise of both Type 1 and
Type 2 diabetes in children. The condition known as “double
diabetes,” previously only studied in adults, has also been reported
27
for the first time in children. In addition, an estimated 61 percent of
overweight youth have at least one additional risk factor for heart
disease, such as high cholesterol or high blood pressure.28
As school funding gaps increase, so does the pressure to sell
competitive foods, which are considered to generate a substantial
revenue stream for schools. Although this argument has been one of
the standard explanations for why schools must sell competitive
foods, the amount of actual school profits—measured against losses in
NSLP reimbursement29 and percentage of profits that inure to
vending and snack suppliers—has been shown to be less than
previously assumed.30
This combination of adverse impacts on children’s health and
concern more generally over junk food marketing to children is
creating increased political pressure on the federal government to
act.31 In the prolonged absence of federal action, many state
legislatures have jumped into the fray to try and fix the problem. But
32
the grassroots momentum that has been building, bubbling up to the

tooth decay is by far the most common. . . . [M]ore than $2 billion is . . . being spent annually
[1973] to repair the ravages of tooth decay.”).
26. Ingrid M. Libman et al., Changing Prevalence of Overweight Children and Adolescents
at Onset of Insulin-Treated Diabetes, 26 DIABETES CARE 2871, 2873 (2003).
27. Ingrid M. Libman et al., Evidence for Heterogeneous Pathogenesis of Insulin-Treated
Diabetes in Black and White Children, 26 DIABETES CARE 2876, 2876 (2003).
28. David S. Freedman et al., The Relation of Overweight to Cardiovascular Risk Factors
Among Children and Adolescents: The Bogalusa Heart Study, 103 PEDIATRICS 1175, 1179
(1999).
29. A Texas Department of Agriculture survey estimated that food service departments
lost more in reimbursable meal sales to competitive foods ($60 million) than annual revenue
from vending contracts ($54 million) for a net loss. TEX. DEP’T OF AGRIC., SCHOOL DISTRICT
VENDING CONTRACT SURVEY (2003), http://www.squaremeals.org/fn/render/channel/items/
0,1249,2348_2515_0_0,00.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2007).
30. See JOHANSON ET AL., supra note 23, at 15.
31. The Institute of Medicine of the National Academies recently gathered information for
a report on nutrition standards for foods in school; the report was completed in April 2007. Inst.
of Med., Projects: Nutrition Standards for Foods in Schools, http://www.iom.edu/CMS/
3788/30181.aspx (last visited Apr. 30, 2007).
32. See infra Part IV.
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state legislative level, has resulted in little meaningful change so far.
Some groups are rallying for federal intervention, whereas others are
content to let the grassroots momentum build and spread.
Questions loom large about effective policymaking and how to
leverage government agency power to improve school food. Is federal
intervention the best path, or should school food remain almost
exclusively under the purview of local school boards? What role can
state laws and regulatory agencies play? As we will show, given the
complex politics and economics of school food, there are no easy
answers.
Whereas some parents and health advocates are trying to curb
competitive food sales in schools, the food industry, along with many
school officials, is attempting to maintain the status quo. Given the
limited federal activity, the food industry has been mostly successful.
Although proposed legislation at the state level has dramatically
increased,34 few bills have become law. Those that have been enacted
35
are inconsistent and weak. This policy impasse has left regulators at
all governmental levels to face contemporary nutrition issues armed
with decades-old regulations based on outdated science. The resulting
tangle of administrative rules and regulations, created amid political
and economic pressures and a general lack of strategic planning,
confounds concerted progress toward healthier school foods.
This Article examines how federal, state, and local policymakers,
health advocates, and industry have employed myriad legislative and
administrative mechanisms in their efforts to influence competitive
food sales. The results sometimes create a healthier school food
environment, yet more often serve to thwart that goal. The analysis of
current policymaking is assessed against the broader historical,
political, and economic context. Overshadowing the uneven results
engendered by the lack of a cohesive policy is a foreboding sense that
the spate of hard-won victories could be short-lived, as was the fate of
several earlier efforts to oust junk foods and sugary beverages from
schools. Lawmakers and advocates have cause to be optimistic that
the intense focus on children’s health and school nutrition will create
of wave of competitive food reforms; previous determined efforts met

33. See infra Part IV.
34. Michele Simon & Ellen J. Fried, State School Vending Laws: The Need for a Public
Health Approach, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 139, 140–41 (2007).
35. See id. at 140-45; infra Part IV.
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36
with a modicum of success. It would be myopic, however, not to
examine why, after sodas and junk foods were removed from some
schools, they not only returned but flourished. Perhaps they were
never fully required to leave.
The virtually unchecked sale of competitive foods in schools is a
core component in the national debate to reduce and ultimately
reverse childhood obesity and diabetes. As competitive foods take
center stage in the national debate over how schools can reverse
rising rates of childhood obesity and diabetes, our purpose is to ask if
the current regulatory approaches are valid public health policy tools
to improve school nutrition. Although the effort is still in its early
stages, rulemaking inconsistency, the lack of rational nutrition
standards, and the virtual absence of a meaningful enforcement
mechanism all suggest the need for more effective, public health–
focused strategies. We propose as the ultimate solution a complete
ban on all competitive foods, in all grades, at all times. Given the
obstacles, inconsistencies, and limitations of current policies and
proposals, only a complete ban would accomplish meaningful public
health reform and truly protect children’s well-being.

I. THE EVOLUTION OF COMPETITIVE FOODS
A. Impacts of Competitive Foods

02__FRIED_SIMON.DOC

1498

7/20/2007 1:44 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:1491

rights” contracts in schools in the 1990s ushered in a period of almost
total saturation and increased consumption both in and out of school.
Children’s intake of added sugars in their diets from soft drink
38
consumption has soared; from 1985 to 1997 school district purchases
of sodas increased by an astonishing 1,100 percent.39 The ubiquity of
sugary beverages, successfully promoted in schools with financial and
other incentives such as scoreboards and band uniforms, has also had
an impact on children’s caloric and nutritional intake.40 One study
found that the consumption by a child of just one additional sugary
beverage per day increased the risk of obesity for that child by 60
percent.41 Watershed studies such as these contradicted beverage
industry assertions downplaying the link between sugary beverage
42
consumption and ill health.
Competitive foods have also been a source of increased calorie
consumption; the growth of portion sizes includes larger packaged
43
snacks and beverage containers. Many schools provide competitive
foods sales from large fast food chains,44 even though fast food meals
are generally high in fat and calories. One study concluded that
competitive foods had a decidedly negative effect on students’
nutrient consumption.45 Students who ate competitive foods
consumed 20 percent more calories and twice as much fat and sugar

38. See Joanne F. Guthrie & Joan F. Morton, Food Sources of Added Sweeteners in the
Diets of Americans, 100 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS’N 43, 51 (2000) (“Americans’ intakes of added
sweeteners exceed levels typically recommended for a diet that meets current
recommendations. Intakes of adolescents are particularly high. The largest source of added
sweeteners in American diets is regular soft drinks, and their consumption appears to be
increasing.”).
39. NESTLE, supra note 37, at 199.
40. French et al., supra note 22, at 1165.
41. David S. Ludwig et al., Relation Between Consumption of Sugar-Sweetened Drinks and
Childhood Obesity: A Prospective, Observational Analysis, 357 LANCET 505, 507 (2001).
42. Compare id., with The Coca-Cola Company, Information Regarding Obesity and Soft
Drinks, http://www.thecoca-colacompany.com/ourcompany/al_obesity_and_softdrinks.html (last
visited Mar. 19, 2007). Also, Coca-Cola’s Health and Wellness Institute turns to science in a
positive vein; it “focuses on how beverages and beverage ingredients can improve health and
help address significant health and nutrition problems around the world.” Beverage Inst. for
Health and Wellness, Research Focus, http://www.thebeverageinstitute.org/about_us/research_
focus.shtml (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
43. Patricia M. Anderson & Kristin F. Butcher, Childhood Obesity Trends and Potential
Causes, 16 FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 2006, at 19, 31.
44. PUB. HEALTH INST., supra note 9, at 9.
45. Susan B. Templeton et al., Competitive Foods Increase the Intake of Energy and
Decrease the Intake of Certain Nutrients by Adolescents Consuming School Lunch, 105 J. AM.
DIETETIC ASS’N 215, 219 (2005).
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as students who did not eat competitive foods. A long-term study that
tracked the eating habits and weights of young adolescents revealed
that each additional fast food meal consumed correlated with a
46
substantial increase in body mass index (BMI).
Competitive foods also adversely impact learning; poor nutrition
and obesity have both been shown to correlate to poor academic
performance. Several studies have found that overweight children are
47
more likely to have behavioral problems, score lower on math and
48
reading tests in kindergarten and first grade, and are twice as likely
to be tagged for remedial and special education classes.49
Purchase of competitive foods displaces the consumption of
fruits, vegetables, and other healthful foods; as the number of vending
machines increases, the consumption of fruit—especially as part of
50
the school meal—decreases. Fat intake also increases when
elementary school students find themselves with greater
opportunities to purchase junk foods at middle school snack bars.51
Despite the lingering problems with school meal quality, when
children are limited to school meal programs, they consume more
healthful nutrients than children who do not eat school foods.52 This
effect is significant because of the enormous number of children who
participate in these programs: 83 percent of all public and private
schools participate in the NSLP, and approximately 60 percent of
children in those participating schools eat the NSLP lunch on a
typical school day.53 School lunches also continue to combat hunger

46. Kiyah J. Duffey et al., Differential Associations of Fast Food and Restaurant Food
Consumption with 3-y Change in Body Mass Index: The Coronary Artery Risk Development in
Young Adults Study, 85 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 201, 203 (2007).
47. Andrew M. Tershakovec et al., Obesity, School Performance and Behaviour of Black,
Urban Elementary School Children, 18 INT’L J. OBESITY & RELATED METABOLIC DISORDERS
323, 323, 325–26 (1994).
48. Ashlesha Datar et al., Childhood Overweight and Academic Performance: National
Study of Kindergartners and First-Graders, 12 OBESITY RES. 58, 58, 60–67 (2004).
49. Tershakovec et al., supra note 47, at 323.
50. Martha Y. Kubik et al., The Association of the School Food Environment with Dietary
Behaviors of Young Adolescents, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1168, 1171 (2003).
51. Karen Weber Cullen & Issa Zakeri, Fruits, Vegetables, Milk, and Sweetened Beverages
Consumption and Access to à la Carte/Snack Bar Meals at School, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 463,
464 (2004).
52. Story et al., supra note 8, at 113.
53. Id. at 111.
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for many children who eat their primary, and sometimes only, meals
54
at school.
2. Marketing and Commercialism Impacts. Competitive foods,
especially soft drinks sold under “pouring rights” contracts, bring
ubiquitous commercialism and marketing to schools. Vending
machines are covered with advertising, serving as de facto billboards.
Moreover, one survey of Texas schools found a plethora of branded
merchandise associated with soda contracts, including shirts, book
covers, sports bags, sunglasses, clocks, cups, coolers, and hats. The
study concluded that “[s]tudents are surrounded by advertising and
brand logos . . . . [T]he true purpose of these contracts is to develop
brand loyalty in students at an early age.”55 The sale of fast food
brands in school also establishes lifelong tastes and eating habits that
favor commercial interests. The inclusion of McDonald’s or Pizza Hut
inside schools implies endorsement of the products and the approval
by school authority figures.
3. Economic Impacts. The adverse nutritional impact of
competitive foods has negative economic effects. When competitive
foods are available, participation in NSLP declines. Also, children
who would otherwise purchase school lunch often purchase
competitive foods instead. Thus, competitive foods tend to decrease
revenue “on two levels, first by diverting revenue away from school
food authorities, and second by replacing federal school breakfast and
lunch reimbursements with family income.”56 The lack of NSLP
participation hurts schools financially because food service
57
departments receive reimbursement for each federal meal. Federal
reimbursement rates, however, do not cover school meal costs
adequately; the percentage of expenses covered by federal
reimbursement fell from 54 percent to 51 percent between 1996 and

54. FOOD RESEARCH & ACTION CTR., STATE OF THE STATES: 2005, at 12–13 (2005),
available at http://www.frac.org/State_Of_States/2005/Report.pdf.
55. TEX. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 29.
56. DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON AGRIC., NUTRITION & FORESTRY,
FOOD CHOICES AT SCHOOL: RISKS TO CHILD NUTRITION AND HEALTH CALL FOR ACTION 26
(2004), available at http://harkin.senate.gov/wellness/Food_Choices_at_School.pdf.
57. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-569, SCHOOL MEAL PROGRAMS: REVENUE
AND EXPENSE INFORMATION FROM SELECTED STATES 5 (2003), available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d03569.pdf.
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2001. School administrators have limited options for increasing meal
program revenues: (1) increasing student participation in school
meals; (2) increasing the cost of a meal to children who pay full price;
and (3) offering more competitive foods and beverages for sale, even
though this often has the paradoxical effect of decreasing NSLP
income.59 Many food service operators choose the last option both to
keep students on campus and to compete with food sold through
vending machines and fundraisers that benefit other school programs.
Even if revenue does increase, it is at the expense of student health.
Competitive foods are continually cited by legislators and school
administrators alike as undermining the nutritional purpose of NSLP
and thereby wasting taxpayer money. One bill to restrict competitive
food sales offers in its support that “as children consume more and
more of the foods typically sold through school vending machines and
snack bars, it undermines the nearly $10 billion in Federal
reimbursements that we spend on nutritionally balanced school
meals.”60 There is also the enormous cost of “plate waste”—NSLP
food served or selected but thrown away when children fill up on
61
snacks and sodas.
Although participation in the NSLP declines as children move on
to secondary schools, the presence of competitive foods is also
responsible for decreased participation in school lunch programs
62
there as well. In states where the sale of competitive foods has been
restricted, participation in NSLP has exceeded the national average.63

58. Id. at 3.
59. Id. at 22–23, 24. Schools may also contain costs in order to minimize their revenue
shortfall. Id. at 20–22, 24.
60. 152 CONG. REC. S3240, 3241 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Harkin)
(referring to the Child Nutrition Promotion and School Lunch Protection Act of 2006, Senate
Bill 2592, 109th Cong., which would amend the Child Nutrition Act of 1966); see infra note 123
and accompanying text.
61. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-96-91, SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM:
CAFETERIA MANAGERS’ VIEWS ON FOOD WASTED BY STUDENTS 1 (1996) available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/rc96191.pdf.
62. Approximately 65 percent of high school females and 54 percent of high school males
do not consume lunches obtained through the National School Lunch Program. Mary Story &
Dianne Neumark-Sztainer, Competitive Foods in Schools: Issues, Trends, and Future Directions,
TOPICS IN CLINICAL NUTRITION 37, 37–38 (1999).
63. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOODS SOLD IN COMPETITION WITH USDA SCHOOL MEAL
PROGRAMS: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 4 (2001), available at http://www.cspinet.org/nutrition
policy/Foods_Sold_in_Competition_with_USDA_School_Meal_Programs.pdf.
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B. Brief History of Competitive Food and the National School Lunch
Program
The National School Lunch Program was enacted in 1946;64 its
first stated aim was to “safeguard the health and well-being of the
65
Nation’s children.” The program was considered necessary for
national security; figures from the Selective Service revealed that onethird of men rejected for military service during World War II
suffered from significant nutritional deficiencies.66 Despite this
laudable goal, from its inception the program has been subject to the
competing interests of the food industry, farmers, agribusiness, school
administrators, nutritionists, and children’s health advocates. In
addition, chronic underfunding of schools in general—and school
meals in particular—has resulted in the unfettered proliferation of
competitive foods in schools. Ironically, increased rates of obesity
render a substantial number of potential recruits unfit for military
service.67
When first enacted in 1946, the NSLP contained no specific
statutory or regulatory provisions relating to the sale of foods outside
the program. The USDA took the position that it was not feasible to
federally regulate sales in thousands of schools that were subject to
68
widely varying circumstances. This demurrer to local administrators
resulted in schools that were increasingly filled with unhealthy foods,
even as the number of schools that participated in the program, and
were thereby subject to NSLP regulations, rapidly grew.69 It also set in
motion a forty-year battle for control over competitive foods in
school. Newspaper reports of candy sold to raise funds for athletic

64. National School Lunch Act of 1946, ch. 281, Pub. L. No. 79-396, 60 Stat. 230 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751–1769 (2000)).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1751 (2000).
66. CLAUDIA PROBART ET AL., PROJECT PA, PREVENTING CHILDHOOD OVERWEIGHT
6 (2004), available at
AND OBESITY: PARENTS CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE
http://nutrition.psu.edu/projectpa/pdfs/parentManual/parentsManual.pdf.
67. Associated Press, Obesity Takes Its Toll on the Military: Officials Increasingly Worried
About Troops Being Too Fat to Fight, MSNBC.COM, July 5, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/8423112 (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
68. Vending Machine Competition with the National School Lunch Program: Hearings
Before the S. Select Comm. on Nutrition and Human Needs, 93d Cong. 20, 21 (1973) [hereinafter
Hekman Statement] (statement of Edward Hekman, Administrator, Food and Nutrition
Service).
69. Rose Dosti, Type A School Lunch Programs Striving for Appetite Appeal, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 21, 1971, at J1. Enrollment grew from 24.8 percent of schools from inception in 1946 to 47.1
percent in 1970. Id.
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70
uniforms in the early 1960s were soon followed by articles decrying
the presence of candy machines in elementary schools and the efforts
of dentists and parents to have them removed.71 The availability of
junk food and soda in schools has fluctuated depending upon the
72
degree of parental pressure on local school boards and the will of
73
Congress to direct the USDA to restrict them.
One of the NSLP’s initial functions—turning surplus
commodities into school food—did not always result in healthy menu
items. For example, inclusions of high-fat, high-calorie items, such as
surplus whole-milk cheese, have been criticized since the program’s
inception.74 The first step toward a healthier school lunch was
congressional amendment to the NLSP through the Child Nutrition
75
Act of 1966, which directed the USDA to develop nutritional
standards for school lunch. The result was dubbed the “Type A”
lunch formula, intended to provide children with one-third of their
daily nutritional requirements.76 The USDA guidelines were
deliberately basic; schools were expected to create menus that
77
followed those guidelines, adapted for their local communities.
Unregulated sales of snacks, candies, and sodas continued to
grow and adversely affect the NSLP by reducing sales of reimbursable

70. See, e.g., Sweets in Sylmar: Students Sell Candy to Help Repay Loans, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
9, 1961, at E2.
71. See, e.g., School Board Delays Purchase of Candies, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1970, at SG7.
72. See Ellen Stern Harris, Consumer Advocate: Comprehensive State Food Plan, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 21, 1977, at F5 (“PTAs that oppose junk foods can try to get action at the local
level . . . .”).
73. Congress directed the Secretary “to take a hard look” at foods that competed with the
balanced school lunch. H.R. REP. NO. 91-81, at 3 (1969), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3014,
3016. “Many State and local school lunch directors will welcome this Federal interest in the
impact on sound nutritional food services of the availability of candy bars, soft drinks and a
snack line in the school cafeterias.” Id.
74. See Story et al., supra note 8, at 111 (“The program should . . . offer . . . healthful lowerfat foods . . . .”).
75. Child Nutrition Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-642, 80 Stat. 885 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1771–1785 (2000)).
76. Type A lunch requirements included the following: “2 ounces of protein in the form of
meat, poultry, cheese, fish, eggs, beans or peas; 1/2 cup fruit and vegetable; 1 serving bread; 1
teaspoon butter and 3/4 cup milk.” Rose Dosti, Type A School Lunch Programs Striving for
Appetite Appeal, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1971, at J1. Serving size was adjusted by school level. Id.
Commodity-based lunch was another option. Id.
77. A USDA official described Type A school lunch as a “‘beautiful picture of what a
balanced meal should be.’ . . . ‘It meets the needs of needy children, it is enormously flexible, it
leaves the door wide open for imaginative use of the general meal pattern and it provides onethird of the nutrients needed daily for a growing body.’” Id.
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meals and undermining the program’s nutritional goals. In 1970,
reacting to pressure from parents and school administrators, Congress
directed the USDA to first define and then regulate competitive
78
foods. Implementing regulations continued to allow the sale of foods
that either met Type A lunch pattern requirements or were served
along with the Type A lunch. That meant à la carte or snack line
items—such as french fries, cake, ice cream, and other high-fat, highcalorie foods that had been offered for sale by schools without
previous USDA restriction—would continue to be available in the
lunchroom at lunchtime, as long as the income “inure[d] to the
benefit of the lunch program.”79 Thus, popular foods were
grandfathered into the lunchroom and permitted to be sold in
competition with NSLP lunches as long as the income went to the
school food service.
Another result was that sales of soft drinks and candies in the
lunchroom at lunchtime were restricted because those items had
rarely been served with school meals and did not meet basic nutrition
80
requirements. Yet regulation of the sale of competitive foods outside
of school serving areas at lunchtime—mostly sugary soft drinks and
junk food often sold in vending machines—were, in effect, left
entirely to state and local officials.81 Although localities could
establish stricter rules and point to federal standards in the
lunchroom to do so,82 few did. As a result, competitive food sales
flourished. Thus, initial attempts to rein in competitive sales of foods
with little or no nutritional value effectively targeted only soda and

78. National School Lunch Act and Child Nutrition Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91248, § 8, 84 Stat. 207, 212–13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1779 (2000)).
79. Hekman Statement, supra note 68, at 22.
80. Child Nutrition Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Elementary, Secondary,
and Vocational Education of the H. Comm. on Education and Labor, 96th Cong. 175 (1979)
(statement of Carol Tucker Foreman, assistant secretary for food and consumer services, United
States Department of Agriculture).
81. Hekman Statement, supra note 68, at 22.
82. Id.; Vending Machine Competition with the National School Lunch Program: Hearings
Before the S. Select Comm. on Nutrition and Human Needs, 93d Cong. 13 (1973) [hereinafter
Plagge Statement] (statement of Gretchen Plagge, Food Service Director, Santa Fe, New
Mexico). “[Federal regulations] did provide a standard under which we could develop
programs.” Vending Machine Competition with the National School Lunch Program: Hearings
Before the S. Select Comm. on Nutrition and Human Needs, 93d Cong. 18 (1973) (statement of
Josephine Martin, administrator, School Food Service Program, Georgia State Department of
Education).
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candy, and even then, local school districts could still continue to sell
83
them outside the lunchroom and during the school day.
Despite the limited scope of the 1970 USDA regulations, these
restrictions still created controversy. The debate centered on school
84
85
86
finances, lost profits for both schools and industry, student choice,
87
and opposition to federal control. As a result of these political
pressures, a 1972 amendment to the NSLP shifted the USDA’s
regulatory authority over competitive foods entirely back to state and
88
local control. The barely two-year-old USDA regulations that
effectively banned lunchroom vending machines selling soda and
candy during lunchtime were scuttled.89 News commentators, school
officials, and members of Congress were furious over the amendment;
Senator Clifford Case, a vocal proponent of healthy school food,
vowed to “give back to the Department of Agriculture the authority
90
to regulate competitive foods in the school lunchroom.”

83. Some schools chose to defy the regulations and kept soda on the menu and in the
lunchroom. LaBarbara Bowman, Stop Soft Drink Sale, County Schools Told, WASH. POST, June
17, 1972, at B2.
84. Plagge Statement, supra note 82, at 13.
85. One United States Congressman charged that “Canteen Corporation, a subsidiary of
International Telephone & Telegraph (ITT), is among [the] interests standing to make the
biggest gain.” Reuss Scores School Vendors, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1973, at A2. Canteen
Corporation was one of the first vending companies to contract on a large scale with schools.
See 75 Years: Canteen Was There from the Beginning, http://www.canteen.com/history.html
(last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
86. See Hekman Statement, supra note 68, at 41. A vending machine representative credited
complaints to Congressmen from students unhappy with loss of vending machine sales for
impetus that led to legislation stripping the USDA of regulatory authority. Id. (“As we
understand the facts, the impetus for the amendment arose in Rochester, Minn., among the
students at Mayo High School.”).
87. Id. at 21–22.
88. The law was known as the “vending machine amendment” because the Senate Select
Committee had announced:
The purpose of the hearing is to explore the impact of last year’s congressional action
removing the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture to regulate the use of vending
machines in schools.
Great concern has been expressed to the committee that the unregulated use of
vending machines dispensing snacks and soft drinks, especially during the lunch
period, will seriously undermine the nutritional effectiveness of the School Lunch
Program.
Vending Machine Competition with the National School Lunch Program: Hearings Before the S.
Select Comm. on Nutrition and Human Needs, 93d Cong. vi (1973).
89. See School Vending Machines Assailed for ‘Junk Food’, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1973, at
12.
90. Vending Machine Competition with the National School Lunch Program: Hearings
Before the S. Select Comm. on Nutrition and Human Needs, 93d Cong. 3 (1973) (statement of
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91

The Senate immediately held hearings. Many national health
organizations issued formal policy statements opposing the
92
amendment because of its adverse impact on children’s health. Local
school administrators testified that they were already feeling pressure
93
to install vending machines, especially from Coca-Cola. Industry
interests described vending machines as merely neutral mechanical
devices that benefited the war effort by allowing hungry workers to
be nourished on around the clock factory shifts.94
Senators repeatedly introduced bills to reestablish federal
authority to regulate competitive foods; the aim was to eliminate junk
95
96
food sales in schools that participated in the NSLP. They all failed.
97
Sales of junk foods soared. By 1977, several states and local school
boards had acted to restrict junk food sales.98 The public momentum
to ban competitive food sales, in turn, led to renewed pressure on
99
Congress, which acted to again restore regulatory authority to the
USDA, this time successfully passing the National School Lunch Act

Senator Clifford Case). Case’s earlier bill to ban the competitive lunchroom sales passed in the
Senate; he blamed USDA’s lack of support for its demise. Id.
91. See supra note 88.
92. Opponents included the American School Food Service Association, the American
Parent Committee, Inc., and the American Dental Association. Vending Machine Competition
with the National School Lunch Program: Hearings Before the S. Select Comm. on Nutrition and
Human Needs, 93d Cong. 3 (1973) (statement of Senator Clifford Case).
93. See Plagge Statement, supra note 82, at 10 (“The pressures of private vending
interests . . . are incredible at the local level.”).
94. Vending Machine Competition with the National School Lunch Program: Hearings
Before the S. Select Comm. on Nutrition and Human Needs, 93d Cong. 43 (1973) (statement of
G. Richard Schrieber, president, National Automatic Merchandising Association).
95. Marion Burros, A Victory for Vending: Can Vigilance Veto Junk Foods?, WASH. POST,
June 9, 1977, at F1.
96. Id. The National Confectioners Association and National Candy Wholesales
Association often took credit for working “together effectively to prevent anticandy rulings
from becoming part of the National School Lunch Act over the years.” Id.
97. Jean Mayer & Johanna Dwyer, Flunk Junk Food Out of School Vending Machines,
L.A. TIMES, June 30, 1977, at I40 (“As every parent knows, vending machines have proliferated
in the last few years and now can be found in school corridors, locker rooms, gyms and even
some study halls.”).
98. “Junk” Food in School, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 14, 1977, at 94 (citing junk
food bans in Gilroy, California; Bloomington, Indiana; Burlington, Wisconsin; Dallas, Texas;
Washington, D.C.; and the states of West Virginia and Massachusetts, as well as junk food
restrictions in twenty-three other states).
99. Marlene Cimons, Citizens Begin Drive to Upgrade School Lunch, Breakfast Programs,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1977, at H25.
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100
Yet “Congress
and Child Nutrition Amendments of 1977.
demanded and received assurances from the USDA that the agency
would not actually ban competitive foods but would only restrict sales
of soft drinks and other foods of minimal nutritional value that ‘did
not make a positive contribution to children’s diets.’”101
The promulgation of final regulations took two years, two sets of
proposed rules, public hearings, and the review of thousands of
comments. A core controversy centered on the definitional standards
created by the USDA and the identification of foods that fit them.
Confectionery interests, having the most revenue to lose, publicly
102
Other
fought the hardest against their products’ inclusion.
arguments voiced in opposition to federal regulation were: all foods
can be consumed in moderation; local control by school boards is
preferable to federal interference; and science does not definitively
establish a causal link between candy, sugary beverages, and dental
disease.103 When the USDA ultimately acted to restrict the sales,
primarily of soda and candy,104 from the beginning of the school day
until the end of the last lunch period, the National Soft Drink
Association (later called the American Beverage Association) and
others sued.
In Community Nutrition Institute v. Bergland,105 industry plaintiffs
argued that Congress intended to restrict sales only within school
106
cafeterias at lunchtime. The court rejected plaintiffs’ analysis,
determined that “[t]he statute itself contains no precise time and
place limitation,” and was “unpersuaded” that Congress had such a

100. National School Lunch Act and Child Nutrition Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95166, 91 Stat. 1325 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751, 1753–1759a, 1760–1762a, 1763,
1766, 1769, 1771–1776, 1779, 1784, 1786, 1788 (2000)).
101. NESTLE, supra note 37, at 209 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-281, at 57 (1977), as reprinted
in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3517, 3573).
102. See Curb Junk Foods in Schools?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 24, 1979, at 59
(interview with James E. Mack). Peanuts and other confectionery ingredients were cited for
their nutritional benefits; if nutrition was inadequate, industry spokesmen presented other
justifications for candy’s continued presence in schools, such as preventing children from
wandering off campus where “they may tend to turn to some other things instead of candy.” Id.
103. Id.
104. 45 Fed. Reg. 6,758, 6,772 (Jan. 29, 1980) (codified, as amended, at 7 C.F.R. § 220 app. B
(2006)). Some local administrators feared the USDA proposal was “weak” and might preempt
stronger local bans. Marian Burros, Junking Some Junk Food, WASH. POST, May 18, 1978, at
E4.
105. Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Bergland, 493 F. Supp. 488 (D.D.C. 1980).
106. Id.
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107
narrow intent. The court’s review of legislative history failed to
support plaintiffs’ argument but instead revealed that “Congressional
debates . . . contain some references suggesting that individual
legislators may have contemplated restrictions limited to the cafeteria
itself. Legislative reports are . . . silent on the subject, and an early
version of the amendment which referred specifically to time and
place limitations was stricken.”108 The appellate court, too, upheld the
USDA’s nutrition standards, but overturned the time and place
restrictions on the ground that the USDA had overstepped statutory
109
bounds. Unlike the district court, two of the three appellate judges
were persuaded by the industry’s argument that the statute contained
time and place limitations and that the restrictions were limited by
the language “‘in food service facilities or areas during the time of
food service.’”110 In addition, the appellate court was presented with
“a plethora of quotes from various members of Congress, selected
from the legislative history” that Congress really intended to set
limited “time and place” restrictions on sales.111 Although not entirely
convinced by the legislative history, the court invalidated the
112
regulations. The dissenting judge disagreed with his colleagues’
analysis and suggested that it was up to the legislature to decide which
judicial interpretation it preferred.113
The National Soft Drink Association had succeeded in
convincing the court that its products could not be sold in the school
cafeteria at lunchtime but were permissible in all other school venues
and at other times during the school day. Essentially, regulation of
competitive foods was rolled back to its 1970 status, with the addition
of a new narrow category of Foods of Minimal Nutritional Value
(FMNV).114 This industry victory opened the floodgates to a renewal
of aggressive marketing of junk foods in schools, accentuated in the
late 1990s by a marked increase in sugary soft drink vending via
exclusive “pouring rights” contracts.115

107. Id. at 495.
108. Id.
109. Nat’l Soft Drink Ass’n v. Block, 721 F.2d 1348, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
110. Id. at 1352 (quoting Child Nutrition Act of 1966, § 7 Pub. L. No. 92-433, 86 Stat. 724
(1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1779 (2000)).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1353.
113. Id. at 1355 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
114. See supra text accompanying note 81.
115. NESTLE, supra note 37, at 197–218.
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Because only the National Soft Drink Association appealed, the
appellate court limited its examination of the USDA regulations as
they applied to the sale of soft drinks. The USDA, however, amended
its regulations on competitive foods the following year not only to
conform to the court rulings, but also to extend protection beyond
soda to the sale of candies.116 The shift in political winds that had led
Congress to restrict sales was at an end, and the expansion of the
regulation to allow even more competitive foods to be sold was not
surprising in light of an administration and secretary of agriculture
117
that sought to entirely revoke USDA restrictions on FMNV.
Congressional efforts to control competitive food sales virtually
ceased until 1994, when Senator Patrick Leahy introduced legislation
not to mandate a ban, but rather to “encourage local school
authorities to restrict or ban the sale of soft drinks and other items of
‘minimal nutritional value’” until the end of the last lunch period.118
Industry interests and school financial pressures derailed these efforts
by reviving the same counterarguments; Coca-Cola even led a letterwriting campaign against the bill.119 A compromise bill passed instead
that merely directed the USDA to provide “model language that bans
the sale of [FMNV] anywhere on elementary school grounds before
the end of the last lunch period” and to provide state agencies with
120
copies of USDA regulations for distribution to secondary schools.
To allay fears of federal preemption of stricter state bans, Congress
left “the choice of when and whether to offer competitive foods
squarely in the hands of State of [sic] local officials.”121

116. Softer Rules for Junk Food, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1984, at A25 (“The court’s ruling, in
a suit filed by soft drink manufactures, said the restriction was not reasonable in the case of soft
drinks; yesterday’s proposal extends the same logic to other sweets.”).
117. After the district court affirmation of the regulations in 1980 and before the appellate
court’s reversal of time and place rules in 1983, the Food and Nutrition Services Administrator
under the Reagan Administration declared that “[t]he department . . . plans to rescind a rule
that prohibits the sale of so-called junk food, such as soda and hard candies, in competition with
school lunch.” Marion Burros, New Federal Policies Alter Food Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21,
1981, at C1. The administrator added, the rule “has merit, but . . . is impossible to enforce or
administer.” Id.
118. Robert Pear, Soda Industry Tries to Avert a School Ban, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1994, at
A15.
119. Robert Pear, Senator, Promoting Student Nutrition, Battles Coca-Cola, N.Y. TIMES.
Apr. 26, 1994, at A20.
120. Better Nutrition and Health for Children Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-448, § 203, 108 Stat.
4699, 4738 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1779 (2000)). The model language concept is
similar to the USDA’s role of providing guidance to federally mandated wellness committees.
121. S. REP. No. 103-300, at 35 (1994).
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Congressional efforts related to competitive foods included a
provision in the 2004 Child Nutrition and Women, Infants, and
Children (WIC) Reauthorization Act that requires local school
districts to establish wellness committees by the beginning of the
122
2006–07 school year. Additional bipartisan efforts led by Senator
Tom Harkin directed the USDA to update and expand the definition
of FMNV to reflect advances in nutritional science and apply those
updated standards to all competitive food sales throughout the school
day in all school venues.123
II. CAN FEDERAL REGULATION
FIX THE COMPETITIVE FOODS PROBLEM?
Federal and local officials have grappled with the impact of
competitive foods on their children’s health and school finances
virtually since the inception of the NSLP. For forty years, the USDA
and local school officials, by congressional mandate, traded the
authority to first define and then regulate the sale of competitive
foods. Table 1 outlines the evolution of NSLP laws and regulations. A
broad pattern emerges: grants of congressional power, intended to
rein in unfettered sales of junk food, are diminished either by
compromise due to political pressure or regulations that leave too
much discretion to school districts. The districts in turn wind up beset
by financial pressures and soon return to junk food sales. The USDA
then finds itself in the diminished role of information clearinghouse,
rather than effective enforcer of NSLP regulations.
The obesity and diabetes epidemics are swinging the pendulum
back toward federal control under which a mandate of congressional
authority and effective USDA regulation could quickly be applied
nationwide. To understand whether federal efforts can improve
school food, we analyze resulting federal legislation seeking to do just
that.
As of March 2007, federal efforts to establish consistent
nationwide nutrition standards for all competitive foods and
beverages sold in schools were embodied in the Child Nutrition

122. Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-265, § 204, 118
Stat. 729, 780–81 (2004).
123. See Child Nutrition Promotion and School Lunch Protection Act of 2006, S. 2592, 109th
Cong. (2006) (aiming “to improve the nutrition and health of school children by updating the
definition of [FMNV]”); Child Nutrition Promotion and School Lunch Protection Act of 2006,
H.R. 5167, 109th Cong. (2006) (same).
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Promotion and School Lunch Protection Act of 2007. First introduced
124
in both houses in May 2006, the bill was reintroduced in the 110th
Congress and continued to enjoy bipartisan support from numerous
125
cosponsors. Although a plethora of bills have sought to improve
school food over the years, none have been as specific: the bill targets
gaps in NSLP statutory authority identified by the appellate court
decision in National Soft Drink Association v. Block, and the USDA’s
failure to update the definition of FMNV.
Table 1. Federal Regulation of Competitive Foods126
Year

Regulation

1966

Child Nutrition Act requires USDA to develop nutritional guidelines
for NSLP; USDA establishes Type A lunch.

1970

USDA granted authority to enact regulations regarding competitive
foods; sale of competitive foods banned in or near cafeterias during
lunchtime. No soft drinks or candy sales permitted in cafeteria or
allowed elsewhere in school unless States and localities establish
more restrictive rules. “Extra food items” were acceptable anywhere
in school if ever sold with Type A lunch; competitive cafeteria sales
benefited school food service.

1972–
1973

USDA authority over competitive foods rescinded; sale of soda and
candy in lunchroom at lunchtime if profits go to school groups. State
agencies and school food authorities delegated authority to set
regulations. Lunchroom competition permitted if profits go to school
groups. Competitive sales through vending machines increase.

1973

Hearings on Vending Machine Competition with National School
Lunch Program take place, revealing loss of NSLP revenue to
competitive food sales, industry pressures on local administrators,
and poor nutritional impact on children’s diets.

1973–
1975

Senator Case introduces bills to restore USDA authority to regulate
competitive foods. Bills fail; competitive foods increase. Local groups
pressure boards and legislatures to oust junk foods and sodas.

1977

USDA authority to regulate competitive foods restored; competitive
foods must be approved by the Secretary.

1978

Proposed rule defines specific foods not approved as competitive. Rule
withdrawn after protests; additional input sought from public.

124. S. 2592; H.R. 5167.
125. Child Nutrition Promotion and School Lunch Protection Act of 2007, S. 771, 110th
Cong. (2007).
126. Table 1 is liberally adapted from NESTLE, supra note 37, at 208–09.
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Table 1 (continued).
Year

Regulation

1979

Amended rule establishes category “foods of minimal nutritional
value” and creates petition process for exemptions.

1980–
1981

Final rule issued. Child health advocates and soft drink industry sue;
USDA prevails in district court.

1983

USDA loses appeal; lacks statutory authority to promulgate “time and
place” restrictions on soda sales outside cafeteria other than
lunchtime.

1985

Issues regulations even less restrictive than court ruling; soda and
FMNV sales prohibited only in cafeteria at lunchtime; no restrictions
on allocation of revenues.

1994

Senate introduces bill encouraging elementary schools to ban soda and
junk food sales; compromise bill directs USDA to provide only
model language.

2004

WIC Reauthorization Act requires local school districts to establish
wellness committees by the beginning of the 2006-07 school year.

2006

Bipartisan Child Nutrition and School Lunch Protection Act
introduced; would direct USDA to update FMNV definition and
grant statutory authority to impose expanded time and place
restrictions–all day and all school venues.

The secretary of agriculture as of 2007 cannot ban the sale of any
food or drink, whether or not it fits within the definition of FMNV,
127
outside the cafeteria or at any time other than mealtime. Also,
many unhealthful competitive foods (but not FMNV) have been
available on à la carte lines in the cafeteria at mealtime ever since
they were approved by the USDA when it first set nutritional
guidelines for Type A lunch.128 The secretary, however, has the
authority to regulate nutritional standards of all school foods.
Although the appellate court struck down the administrative attempt
to put time and place restrictions on competitive food sales

127. See supra notes 105–16 and accompanying text.
128. It is difficult to get a precise measure of how much and where competitive foods are
sold. USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service found that most competitive foods are sold in the
cafeteria at lunchtime and that the same foods, such as fruit drinks, salty snacks, baked goods,
“are sold simultaneously by the [à] la carte cafeteria venues and vending machines.” OFFICE OF
ANALYSIS, NUTRITION & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. MEASURING COMPETITIVE
FOODS IN SCHOOLS 3–4 (2004), available at http://www.fns.usda.gov/oane/MENU/Published/
CNP/FILES/CompFoodSum.pdf.
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throughout the entire school day, it never questioned the USDA’s
129
authority to set competitive food guidelines.
The definition of FMNV must be updated; if the USDA will not
exercise its authority, then legislation must direct the agency to do so.
Also, to exercise that authority meaningfully, the congressional
mandate must clearly provide time and place regulatory powers to the
USDA. Nutritional standards must be applied in all school venues
throughout the entire school day.
One cogent analysis (predating the act but still relevant to an
analysis of competitive food) was offered by Carol Tucker Foreman,
the administrator central to the proceedings that established the
USDA definition of FMNV.130
Foreman was appointed assistant secretary of agriculture for
food and consumer services by President Carter and served in that
capacity from 1977 to 1981. During her tenure, Congress shifted
authority over junk food from local control back to the USDA
through a 1977 amendment to the Child Nutrition Act requiring
131
competitive foods be approved by the USDA. The return of
regulatory powers directed the secretary to disallow only those foods
that did “not make a positive nutritional contribution in terms of their
overall impact on children’s diets and dietary habits.”132 The secretary
was not given further direction on how to determine the standards to
apply in identifying foods destined to be banned or restricted in
schools that participated in the NSLP. By comparison, the 2006 Child
Nutrition Promotion and School Lunch Protection Act offered
several measures for the secretary to consider when viewing the
entire nutritional picture. Even with the additional directives detailed
in the bill, determining new nutritional standards requires the
exercise of some discretion; this is one area in which regulators’
decisions are potentially most vulnerable to challenge. The
congressional directives, however, are intended to ensure that the
USDA broadens the scope of the FMNV definition and employs a

129. See Nat’l Soft Drink Ass’n v. Block, 721 F.2d 1348, 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (granting
“deference to the expertise” of the Secretary of Agriculture to set competitive food guidelines).
130. Carol Tucker Foreman, Remarks at the University of Arkansas Conference on Legal
and Policy Issues Related to Obesity: The Uses of the Law to Address the Epidemic (May 5,
2005) (transcript on file with the Duke Law Journal).
131. National School Lunch Act and Child Nutrition Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95166, 91 Stat. 1325 (1977) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1771 (2000)).
132. H.R. Rep. No. 95-708, at 26 (1977) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3555, 3573.
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strong science-based approach while attempting to stave off industry
attacks on the methodology as arbitrary and capricious.
Speaking at a legal conference in 2005, Foreman pointed out that
although constrained by governing statutes, “[r]egulators can choose
to read the law narrowly or view their mandate expansively, to use
the bully pulpit to educate both public policy makers or hide in their
133
offices.” She described the first attempt by the USDA to identify
categories of non-nutritious foods, followed by the broad application
of time and place restrictions, as “based on the slimmest
congressional mandate.”134 In other words, USDA administrators at
that time were focused on establishing bold initiatives that would
make a difference by restricting the time and place of competitive
food sales. After the appellate decision in Block struck down the
secretary’s broad application, USDA administrators never again
sought to control competitive foods in any meaningful way. Whether
administrators use the Harkin bill’s grant of powers to effect
meaningful change remains to be seen.
In assessing the school lunch situation across the nation in 2005,
Foreman noted that “many school districts openly flout” nutrition
requirements for school meals.135 A 2001 government review revealed
that only 15 percent of elementary schools and 13 percent of
secondary schools meet the NSLP program requirements for
saturated fat.136 Schools can do this “without fear,” Foreman pointed
out, because the “USDA has very few tools to require compliance”
and enforcement options are limited.137 For example, if the USDA
refused to provide federal support to noncompliant school districts,
“the burden would fall not on the school system personnel who’ve
failed to meet the rules but on poor children who depend on school
138
lunch to get enough calories.” The same would be true with
competitive food.
The litany of issues that lead schools to allow the sale of
competitive foods has been consistent throughout the forty-year

133.
134.
135.
136.

Foreman, supra note 130, at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 6.
OFFICE OF ANALYSIS, NUTRITION & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOOD &
NUTRITION SERV., SCHOOL NUTRITION DIETARY ASSESSMENT STUDY-II FINAL REPORT 89
(2001), available at http://www.fns.usda.gov/oane/menu/Published/CNP/FILES/sndaII.pdf.
137. Foreman, supra note 130, at 6.
138. Id.
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attempt to curb junk food in schools. School administrators argue that
à la carte lines in which foods do not meet the USDA’s dietary
guidelines “must stay because children don’t like and won’t eat the
139
approved meals and the foodservice must [meet financial goals].”
Some districts even threaten to have no school feeding programs at
all rather than invest more money.140 Foreman notes: “This, they
remind us, would hurt poor children who receive free lunches and
141
often use school lunch as their primary meal of the day.” These
funding arguments must be resolved so that enforcement can
improve.
Finally, Foreman suggested revising and updating the twentyfive-year-old definition of FMNV. She noted, “If USDA is nervous
about this venture and fearful of the purveyors of candy, cookies, and
soda, they could always defer to the [National Academy of Sciences]
142
to set the standard.”
To achieve these goals, the new bill specifically directs the
143
USDA to update nutritional standards. Further, as part of its
decisionmaking in revising the definition, the bill specifies that the
USDA “shall” consider various nutrients, scientific evidence of
connection between diet and health, and recommendations from
scientific organizations.
The bill requires the Secretary of Agriculture to apply the
updated standards everywhere on school grounds and throughout the
school day. The bill, however, would probably not affect school
parties, classroom celebrations, or fundraisers taking place off school
144
grounds. This has been a particularly contentious area throughout
the history of regulating competitive foods; the bill allows these areas
to remain in the discretion of local authorities, which could dilute the
impact of new standards.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 8. An Institute of Medicine committee report providing these definitions and
setting nutrition standards in schools was released April 2007. Inst. of Med., Projects: Nutrition
Standards for Foods in Schools, http://www.iom.edu/CMS/3788/30181.aspx (last visited Apr. 30,
2007).
143. For the full text of the new bill, see Child Nutrition Promotion and School Lunch
Protection Act of 2007, S. 771, 110th Cong. (2007).
144. See Press Release, Senator Tom Harkin, The Child Nutrition Promotion and School
Lunch Protection Act of 2006, available at http://www.harkin.senate.gov/documents/pdf/
schoolfood.pdf (“The proposed legislation does not affect school parties and classroom
celebrations and also provide [sic] exemptions for school fundraisers.”).
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The bill addresses the primary statutory deficiency identified in
Block by specifically granting time and place regulatory authority to
the USDA. To assess whether congressional action, followed by
USDA administrative actions, will achieve the Act’s stated goal “to
145
improve the nutrition and health of schoolchildren,” several issues
must be analyzed and measured against the background of previous
efforts to achieve the same goal.
Senator Harkin’s bill addresses Foreman’s suggestion and the
lack of statutory authority cited by the appellate court. Statutory
language explicitly establishes time and place rules that cover the
entire school throughout the school day, so there should be no room
146
for judicial interpretation of congressional intent on this issue. The
bill directs the USDA to update the definition of FMNV. A time limit
to accomplish this goal is mandated by statute. This reflects both the
immediacy of the task and awareness that the USDA might otherwise
be reluctant to tackle it. The specific nature of the considerations that
the USDA must review should create a strong, science-driven basis
for the updated definition of FMNV, one that will likely avert
litigation. The political climate and building grassroots momentum
may bode well for passage of this bill or a similar one. With the
support of the scientific community, updated nutritional guidelines
that apply throughout school and all day could become a reality. Even
such an optimistic outcome, however, will likely take significant time
and effort to achieve, and enforceability remains uncertain. There are
also concerns about whether the bill might preempt states and school
districts from having stronger policies. If it does, this bill could do
more harm than good.
III. STATE REGULATORY ATTEMPTS:
FILLING THE FEDERAL VOID WITH CHAOS
In recent years, state legislatures have taken center stage in the
battle over the sale of soda and junk food in schools. In recent work,
we found that, between 2003 and 2005, forty-five state legislatures

145. Child Nutrition Promotion and School Lunch Protection Act of 2007, S. 771, 110th
Cong. (2007).
146. See Nat’l Soft Drink Ass’n v. Block, 721 F.2d 1348, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“An
examination of the legislative history leads to the conclusion, albeit inconclusively, that the
Congressional intent was to confine the control of junk food sales to the food service areas
during the period of actual meals service.”).
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considered bills intended to limit the availability of soft drinks and
147
junk food in public schools.
In 2005 alone, forty-two state legislatures proposed or enacted
measures that require or recommend nutritional guidance for
148
schools. Despite all this effort, results have been mixed. One
analysis found that only sixteen states set nutrition standards on
competitive foods, while twenty have time and place restrictions on
junk food sales.149 According to another report, twenty-two states
limit the sale of soft drinks at some grade level, but only ten states
have both food and beverage standards that apply throughout the
day, everywhere, and throughout all grades.150
Moreover, the impact of the legislation varies significantly, from
setting nutrition standards, to suggesting voluntary action. Our
previous analysis of state legislation151 argues that political
compromise is creating a form of “nutritional chaos”—a patchwork of
laws and regulations that make little sense from a public health
perspective. In at least ten states, legislatures passed bills with weaker
language than was originally introduced, a result of political lobbying
and the inevitable compromise of policymaking. In many other states,
the bills introduced were already weak.152 The specific language of
each bill also varies significantly.153
What are some of the specific challenges that policymakers and
advocates are coming up against? Although it may seem like
commonsense policy to require that schools not sell unhealthy food

147. Simon & Fried, supra note 35, at 140–41. For a summary of the various state legislation,
see generally Michele Simon, Can Food Companies Be Trusted to Self-Regulate? An Analysis of
Corporate Lobbying and Deception to Undermine Children’s Health, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 169
(2006).
148. Nanci Hellmich, Health Movement Has School Cafeterias in a Food Fight, USA
TODAY, Aug. 22, 2005, at A1; see also Linda Jacobson, Calif. Says ‘No’ to School Junk-Food
Sales, EDUC. WK., Sept. 28, 2005, at 20 (describing restrictions in California legislation on food
and drinks sold in schools).
149. TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH, F AS IN FAT: HOW OBESITY POLICIES ARE FAILING
IN AMERICA 32 (2006), available at http://healthyamericans.org/reports/obesity2006/Obesity
2006Report.pdf.
150. MARGO WOOTAN ET AL., CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST, SCHOOL FOODS
REPORT CARD 3 (2006), available at http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/school_foods_report_card.pdf.
Such “report cards” that simply catalogue bills fail to tell the entire story. The devil is truly in
the details.
151. Simon & Fried, supra note 34, at 139, 150.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 140.
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and beverages to children in the wake of an obesity epidemic, these
bills have been far from easy to pass.
State legislatures all over the nation have faced fierce industry
opposition. For example, in Connecticut, where one of the most
heated battles took place, the house debate went on for eight hours,
with some politicians making typical industry arguments while
154
displaying bottles of Coke on their desks. More than $200,000 was
spent to lobby against the bill. The bill finally passed, only to be
155
vetoed by the governor. Lobbying has been largely from the soft
drink industry, which argues that school boards (“local control”), not
state legislatures, should make these decisions.156 In some states,
school administrators have also opposed state mandates mainly
157
because they fear loss of revenue.
What are some examples of how legislative language gets
compromised? Most often, a bill with mandatory language winds up
being voluntary. Another common compromise is to exempt high
schools—or sometimes even middle schools—so that the law only
applies to elementary schools. Sometimes bills wind up only requiring
a wellness policy, which is redundant to federal legislation already on
158
the books.
A. Setting Nutrition Standards—Legislative or Regulatory Approach
States take a variety of approaches to setting school nutrition
standards. These approaches break down as follows:
1. Passing a law with nutrition standards contained in the bill
159
language;
2. Passing a law that defers responsibility to write the
160
standards to a state regulatory body;
154. MICHELE SIMON, APPETITE FOR PROFIT 230–33 (2006).
155. Id. The governor would later sign a compromise bill.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See infra Part III.D.
159. Examples include California, The Pupil Nutrition, Health, and Achievement Act of
2001, CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49430 (West 2005), and Indiana, IND. CODE § 20-26-9 (2005).
160. The twelve states that to date have considered or passed legislation that requires
regulations to be set by another regulatory body are Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-242
(2006), Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-7-133 (2005), Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5128
(2006), Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 158.852, 158.854 (West 2005), Louisiana, LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 17:197 (2007), Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A § 6602 (2006), New Mexico,
N.M. Stat. § 22-13-13.1 (2005), North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-264.3 (2006),
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3. Passing a law that defers responsibility to local schools and
161
districts;
4. Setting nutrition standards through a state regulatory body
162
without enabling legislation; and
163
5. Some combination of the approaches described above.
Usually, either nutrition standards develop through the
legislative process and appear in specific statutory language in the
enacted final law, or the task is delegated to another body. In most
states that have passed laws, the legislature takes initial action, and
the education department or another administrative body (sometimes
an ad hoc committee) then promulgates the standards.
There are pros and cons to each method. Because the legislative
process is highly politicized and not always conducive to rational
scientific evaluation, appointing a committee to flesh out nutritional
requirements makes sense. Although potentially more limited in
scope, the legislative process provides transparency and public
accountability that administrative committee deliberations might not.
Although it may seem intuitive that the regulatory process would
be less subject to political pressures than the legislative process (at
least at the state level), this is not necessarily the case. In addition,
what might seem like a relatively simple process of setting state
regulations can often turn into a long, drawn-out affair.
Some states are bypassing the legislative process altogether and
relying solely on administrative authority to make changes. In Texas,
the Secretary of Agriculture implemented a number of school food

South Carolina, H. 3346, 2005–2006 Gen. Assem., 116th Sess. (S.C. 2005), Tennessee, TENN.
CODE ANN. § 49-6-1401 (2006), Vermont, H. 272, 2003–2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2004), and
West Virginia, W. Va. Code Ann. § 5-1E-3 (LexisNexis 2006).
161. This model is very similar to the wellness policy approach of the federal government.
Examples include Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-401 (LexisNexis 2006), Oregon, S.
860, 73rd Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005), and Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-21-28
(2006).
162. Examples include Illinois, ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 23, § 305 (2006), New Jersey, STATE
OF N.J. DEP’T OF AGRIC., MODEL SCHOOL NUTRITION POLICY, http://www.nj.gov/agriculture/
divisions/fn/childadult/school_model.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2007), and Texas, TEX. DEP’T OF
AGRIC., TEXAS PUBLIC SCHOOL NUTRITION POLICY (2004), available at http://www.square
meals.org/vgn/tda/files/2348/2538_Texas%20Public%20School%20Nutrition%20Policy.pdf.
163. For example, Texas set regulations first, then later passed a law to grant certain
exemptions; Kentucky set minimum standards on beverages in law and directed regulatory body
to set remaining regulations. See Simon & Fried, supra note 34, at 141–43. Arkansas legislation
appointed an advisory committee to make recommendations to the State Board of Education.
Infra notes 169–73 and accompanying text.
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reforms to both meals and competitive foods. Texas also requires
school districts to have localized policies that conform to state agency
164
rules. New Jersey also went directly to the administrative route
(without passing any enabling legislation) and requires all schools to
165
conform to state guidelines.
Yet questions remain about the best way to go about solving this
problem. Do states that bypass the legislative process have better
success? What about a combined legislative/regulatory approach?
Consider three examples of states that each followed a different path.
166

1. California’s Statutory Soda Ban and Politics by Ultimatum.
Often a policy bellwether for the nation, California has been a hotbed
of activity over school nutrition for years. The Los Angeles Unified
School District (the nation’s second-largest) unanimously passed a
policy that took effect in 2004 and no longer allows the sale of soda in
schools, becoming the first district in the nation to do so in a wave of
public activism to improve school nutrition.167 In 2003, grassroots
momentum resulted in proposed legislation that would have banned
soda sales in all public schools throughout the entire state—
kindergarten through twelfth grade. A nonprofit advocacy group, the
California Center for Public Health Advocacy (CCPHA), led the
charge to pass this groundbreaking bill, which was sponsored by
California state Senator Deborah Ortiz. CCPHA and others
presented overwhelming scientific evidence of a growing public
health menace caused by children drinking too much soda, much of
which is consumed at school. Wasting no time, the soda industry
mounted strong opposition. A combination of behind-the-scenes and
up-front industry lobbying on the soda-ban bill resulted in a proposed
amendment that would allow high schools to be exempt. (Not
coincidentally, most sodas in schools are sold at the high school level.)
Such an exemption was never the intent of either the nutrition
advocates or Senator Ortiz, the people actually proposing the policy
in the first place. In the end, corporate lobbying forced an ultimatum.
Either Ortiz’s bill would die in its entirety, or it would survive and
ban sodas only for kindergarten through 8th grade. Senator Ortiz and
the advocates accepted the compromise. Advocates were again

164.
165.
166.
167.

TEX. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 162, at 1.
STATE OF N.J. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 162.
For full detail of the California episode, see SIMON, supra note 155, at 224–28.
See infra Part IV.A.
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successful two years later in 2005 when another law passed to finally
get sodas out of California high schools, thanks in part to backing by
Republican Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. (Most other
politicians backing these measures were Democrats.) But even that
bill had compromises. For example, the bill permitted sugary “sports
drinks” such as Gatorade. Interestingly, the reason was that the
previous bill included a compromise, and so two years later a bill that
only applied to high schools could not set stricter rules. The thinking
was that it did not make sense to have stronger nutrition standards in
high school than in middle and elementary schools. Also, the law
allows for a long phase-in period, with full compliance not required
until 2009. Thus, it is still unclear how successful this legislation will
be in creating long-lasting change throughout the state, particularly
beyond urban centers such as Los Angeles and San Francisco, where
changes have already been made. (Such urban areas will be largely
unaffected by the legislation because their existing policies are
stronger.) California advocates have also expressed concern that a
weaker federal bill might preempt the state law, essentially undoing
the hard work advocates took six years to get into place.168
2. Arkansas—Passing a Law, Followed by Regulations. In
thinking of states on the cutting edge of public health policy,
Arkansas—ranked seventh-highest in the nation for obesity in
2006169—might not immediately spring to mind. But thanks in part to
170
a high-profile governor who made health promotion a statewide
priority, this perception is changing. Arkansas health policy leaders in
1999 first started to recognize the health burden that obesity was
placing on the state’s healthcare system.171 As a result of
recommendations from the state health department, coupled with
Governor Mike Huckabee’s personal-turned-public health crusade,
Arkansas passed a law in 2003 to address childhood obesity through a
variety of policy mechanisms.

168. E-mail from Harold Goldstein, Executive Director, California Center for Public Health
Advocacy, to Michele Simon (Dec. 21, 2006, 3:30 PM) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
169. TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH, supra note 149, at 6.
170. After losing 110 pounds, Republican Governor Mike Huckabee went public with his
experience by promoting his book, MIKE HUCKABEE, QUIT DIGGING YOUR GRAVE WITH A
KNIFE AND FORK: A 12-STOP PROGRAM TO END BAD HABITS AND BEGIN A HEALTHY
LIFESTYLE (2005).
171. Kevin W. Ryan et al., Arkansas Fights Fat: Translating Research into Policy to Combat
Childhood and Adolescent Obesity, 25 HEALTH AFF. 992, 995 (2006).
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The law created a fifteen-member statewide Child Health
Advisory Committee (CHAC) to, among other things, (1) make
recommendations to the state Board of Education and state Board of
Health regarding nutrition standards in public schools, (2) eliminate
access to vending machines in public elementary schools, (3) require
that schools disclose contracts for competitive foods and beverages,
(4) assess body mass index for all public school students, and (5)
create school district level advisory committees to create local
policies.172
The legislative process involved placing in the bill provisions on
which there was clear agreement, such as removing vending from
elementary schools. But where issues became more controversial,
such as vending in middle and high schools, the advisory committee
was directed to make recommendations to the state Board of
Education. This approach had the added benefit that the advisory
committee could make independent recommendations without review
or approval by either the legislature or the governor.173 The bill
became law without controversy in April 2003.
But when it came time for the advisory committee to get to work,
the heated debate began. Immediately, local school administrators
became nervous about additional “unfunded mandates” from the
174
state on “non-educational” matters. The usual battles over local
control ensued. The advisory committee took a full year to review the
evidence related to the impact of competitive foods and made its
recommendations, including changes to both competitive and
175
cafeteria food, in early 2005. The public comment period resulted in
the Board of Education promulgating less stringent rules. One critical
issue was whether the guidelines would be required or voluntary at
the local level. Even the governor flip-flopped on this question: In
2004, he said there should be proof that the presence of vending
machines in schools contributed to obesity and expressed a
preference for local control, citing the usual concerns over loss of
revenue.176 Yet after a second comment period, during which he
172. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-133 to -135 (2003).
173. Ryan et al., supra note 171, at 997.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See Arkansas Gov. Mike Huckabee Wants Proof that Vending Machines Lead to
Childhood Obesity Before Enacting Regulations, VENDING MARKET WATCH, June 22, 2004,
http://www.amonline.com/article/archive_article.jsp?siteSection=1&displayMonth=June&displa
yYear=2004 (last visited Apr. 6, 2007) (follow the hyperlink titled “Arkansas Gov. Mike
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apparently felt some political heat, Governor Huckabee reversed
177
course and called for mandatory regulatory language. The revised
rules closely followed the committee’s original recommendations.178
Most of the other challenges faced at the state level revolved around
the requirement for BMI testing and concerns over implementation,
funding, and privacy.179
According to an account by several employees with the Arkansas
Center for Health Improvement (the agency charged with overseeing
BMI measurements), there are important lessons to be learned from
the Arkansas experience, most notably the following:
A proposed policy (such as legislation) should be clear in its intent
and in the mechanism with which to achieve the desired change, yet
not attempt to prescribe in detail what the changes must be (for
example, creating the CHAC to recommend rules and regulations
provided a mechanism for future change without generating
180
resistance to the proposed legislation).

3. Giving Up on Legislation, Turning to Regulation: Illinois and
the Tug of War Between Legislators and Regulators. Since 2003,
Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich has tried to pass legislation to get
soda and junk food out of public schools.181 A 2004 bill failed due to
lobbying by the soft drink industry coupled with opposition from
182
principals and coaches. Next, the governor turned to the regulatory
process.
In November 2005, Governor Blagojevich started to put pressure
on the Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE) to create new rules

Huckabee wants proof that vending machines lead to childhood obesity before enacting
regulations”).
177. Ryan et al., supra note 171, at 998.
178. See id.
179. Id. at 998–1000.
180. Id. at 1001.
181. See Krista Kafer, Vending Machine Bills Defeated in Colorado, Illinois, SCH. REFORM
NEWS, July 1, 2006, available at http://www.heartland.org/Article.cfm?artId=19262 (last visited
Apr. 6, 2007).
182. See Susan Jones, Groups Blast Proposed Junk Food Ban in Schools, CNSNEWS.COM,
Feb. 12, 2004, http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewNation.asp?Page=%5CNation%5Carchive%5C200
402%5CNAT20040212a.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2007).
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183
for junk foods in school. The ISBE responded in early December of
that year with some proposed definitions.184
These definitions, however, also met with protest. According to
one account,

Several advocates and board members worried out loud about lost
school revenue and a loss of local school district control. They also
wondered whether a proposed definition of “minimally nutritious”
food could exclude the sale of higher calorie yogurt while allowing
185
for the sale of lower calorie foods such as low fat Cheetos.

Nevertheless, the ISBE eventually approved the amendments in
March 2006.186
But the battle was not over. The Joint Committee on
Administrative Rules (JCAR)—a legislative bipartisan committee
within the Illinois General Assembly “authorized to conduct
systematic reviews of administrative rules promulgated by state
agencies”187—voted ten to one to reject the ISBE’s recommendations,
saying the board should also consider school meal quality and
suggesting the formation of a legislative “school wellness” task force
devoted to children’s health and nutrition.188
Next, in June 2006, the Illinois State Board of Education
submitted a revised proposal to the JCAR which still had final say
over rule changes. To comply with the JCAR, the board consulted
with school districts and several education associations and said it

183. Dave McKinney & Rosalind Rossi, Gov Renews Fight Against Junk Food, CHI. SUNTIMES, Nov. 29, 2005, at 16.
184. See Press Release, State of Illinois, Illinois State Board of Education Unveils New
Proposed Rules Banning Junk Food from Illinois Elementary and Middle Schools (Dec. 9,
2005), available at www.isbe.state.il.us/news/2005/dec9_05.pdf; see also Rosalind Rossi, State
School Board May Ban Whole Milk, Allow Chips, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 10, 2005, at 5
(explaining that “unlike current Illinois rules, which specifically crack down on ‘candy’ and
‘potato chips,’ the new rules would not ban any specific junk food . . . . [but] [i]nstead, the rules
create a definition of what junk food is, based on nutritional content).
185. Kate N. Grossman, Proposed Junk-Food Ban ‘Goes too Far’: Critics Fear Loss of
School Revenue, District Control, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 15, 2005, at 23.
186. See Maudlyne Ihejirika, Ban on Junk Food Sales at Schools Starts this Fall, CHI. SUNTIMES, Mar. 17, 2006, at 24.
187. See LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT SERVS., 2005-2006 ILLINOIS BLUE BOOK 1 (2005–06),
available at http://www.cyberdriveillinois.com/publications/illinois_bluebook/2005_2006/legislat
ive_branch/legsupport.pdf.
188. Ann Sanner, State Panel Rejects Ban on School Junk Food, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 12,
2006, at 14.
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would revise its nutritional standards once the School Wellness Policy
189
Task Force issued a report in January 2007.
Notably, the revised rules, which apply only to kindergarten
through eighth grade, were weakened in several respects including:
allowing one-year exemptions for existing vending machine contracts;
eliminating the restriction on beverage serving size; regulating food
sales only during non-meal times (thus allowing junk food sales other
than the federal FMNV allowed during meal times); and removing
the reference to trans-fatty acids because information about their
190
content is not readily available on all food packaging.
191
In October 2006, the JCAR lifted its objection and the
192
But to complicate matters, the
modified rules were filed.
rulemaking did not end there. Instead, the proposed changes required
the ISBE to revisit the nutrition standards by initiating a new
rulemaking procedure that would align with the statewide nutrition
standards to be recommended by the School Wellness Policy Task
Force.193 The task force report, originally slated for release in January
2007, was past due. So an effort that started in 2003 was not finished
four years later. Also, even with all this effort, the rules still failed to
address high schools—where most of the soda and junk food is sold—
despite the governor’s call for a ban on soda and junk food in all
schools. Thus, political and economic pressures remain, even at the
regulatory level.
B. Evaluating Various State-Level Approaches to Policymaking
Given that states are setting policies related to competitive foods
in various ways, the question arises: is there a preferred or “best”
method? Answering this question depends on outcome measures.
One measure should be whether the final nutrition standards are in
the children’s best health interests. Just as compromises that have no
basis in nutrition are made in legislation, the standards that emerge
from regulations are far from perfect from a health perspective. For
example, why did Illinois leave out high schools? Moreover, why are

189. See Kate N. Grossman, State Board Passes New School Junk-Food Ban, CHI. SUNTIMES, June 23, 2006, at 24.
190. 30 Ill. Reg. 15832 (Sept. 29, 2006).
191. 30 Ill. Reg. 17132 (Oct. 27, 2006).
192. 30 Ill. Reg. 17475 (Nov. 3, 2006).
193. Id. at 17484.
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fruit smoothies allowed at a whopping 400 calorie limit—too much for
any child? Clearly, children’s health is still not being put first.
Moreover, comparing standards across states proves problematic
because each set has its plusses and minuses, and more information is
needed to evaluate them. For example, although it seems that
Arkansas has a “good” provision because it does not allow vending in
elementary schools, that does not explain the extent to which this was
even a problem prior to the law. That the provision passed the state
legislature so easily indicates its relatively minor importance.
Also, although Illinois can be criticized for only applying its
regulations to kindergarten through eighth grade, it is unclear
whether leaving out high schools was a result of the particular policy
route that the state chose to take. Indeed, as California demonstrated,
it was a political challenge to include high schools via the legislative
route as well. Moreover, Illinois was unable to enact any legislation at
all, so perhaps some regulation is better than nothing.
Finally, just looking at the nutrition standards on paper does not
take into account the enforceability mechanism, which in each of
these three case studies is unclear. State education departments often
have standard oversight procedures in place for any rules. But how
that oversight will be implemented regarding new school vending
requirements remains to be seen. Moreover, national school meal
nutrition standards, which states are responsible for monitoring, are
194
consistently violated. So why would states do a better job of
enforcing competitive food regulations?
Another outcome measure might be to simply ask which method
is best in achieving lasting policy change, whatever that might be. This
too is still speculative and can cut both ways. Because legislation is
harder to pass, it might seem intuitive that it would also be harder to
overturn. Thus, a state like California might be more stable than, say,
a state like New Jersey, which only has regulations on the books. On
the other hand, legislative bodies tend to change more rapidly and
shift with political winds more frequently than regulatory agencies.
It seems that which approach is best depends on the particular
politics of that state in that particular moment in history. For

194. The federal government reports that three-quarters of schools have not met the
USDA’s 30 percent limit for calories from fat in school lunches. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO-03-506, SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM: EFFORTS NEEDED TO IMPROVE
NUTRITION
AND
ENCOURAGE
HEALTHY
EATING
3
(2003)
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03506.pdf.
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example, who could have predicted that two Republican governors
(in California and Arkansas) would provide the necessary leadership
to resist industry pressure in their respective states? And in each of
these two cases, the path was different: California took an exclusively
legislative approach, but Arkansas employed a combination of
legislation and regulation.
In summary, although there is much activity in state legislatures,
it can take a long time—often years—to get a significant bill and any
related regulations passed, in part because this issue remains such a
political battlefield. The results are a patchwork of compromised
policies, with little connection to children’s health, or sometimes even
common sense. Moreover, the potential impact remains to be seen
because of looming questions regarding enforcement and
accountability.
IV. LOCAL ACTIVITY:
CONVERGENCE OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND GRASSROOTS
The grassroots momentum building at the school district level,
particularly around soft drinks in schools, parallels state and federal
activity. As mentioned earlier, Los Angeles was the first major school
district in the nation to replace soda with healthier drinks.195 Other
major cities around the country, including Seattle, Chicago, Boston,
Philadelphia, and New York, have instituted similar beverage
policies.196 Many major school districts have also implemented
nutrition guidelines for snack foods, improved the school meal
197
programs, or done both. Because there is still plenty of room for
improvement in the rest of the nation’s schools beyond urban centers,
however, advocates keep pushing for change at the state and federal
levels.
As discussed earlier, in some states this grassroots momentum
has bubbled up to state legislatures or regulatory bodies, with mixed
results. One compromise reached in state legislatures (instead of
setting mandatory guidelines) has been to “encourage” schools and

195. Kim Severson, L.A. Schools To Stop Soda Sales: District Takes Cue from Oakland Ban,
S.F. CHRON., Aug. 28, 2002, at A1.
196. See Simon, supra note 147, at 173.
197. For example, the Farm to School Program has connected these school lunch programs
with local farms in an effort to improve the nutrition of school lunches. See Farm to School
Program, About the National Farm to School Program, http://www.farmtoschool.org/about.htm
(last visited Apr. 6, 2007).
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198
districts to set their own nutrition standards. It is potentially
counterproductive to pass such a voluntary bill, however, because it
could result in lawmakers mistakenly thinking the problem has been
199
solved. Other states, trying to go further than just voluntary
language, have instead required school districts to set their own
policies.200 The problem here is that such a law is redundant to the
federal wellness policy requirement and potentially confusing to
201
schools.

A. Wellness Policies and Local Control
In 2004, in lieu of setting federal standards, Congress mandated
that by the start of the 2006–07 school year all schools participating in
the NSLP must have local wellness policies in place that address
nutrition and physical activity.202 Although the federal law is
theoretically mandatory, the lack of punishment and enforcement
mechanisms means that it is essentially voluntary.
With the wellness policies, the mixed messages coming from the
federal government suggest that it does not want to touch this again,
but it is going to require local schools to develop their own language
rather than just provide models (although the federal government
continues to do that too). No additional funding or other financial
incentive was offered to schools with the wellness policy law.

198. For these voluntary bills, some states have provided model guidelines for schools to
follow. See, e.g., CHILD NUTRITION & WELLNESS, KANSAS STATE DEP’T OF EDUC., KANSAS
SCHOOL WELLNESS POLICY MODEL GUIDELINES (2005), available at http://www.kn-eat.org/
SNP/SNPDocs/Wellness/Wellness_Policy_Guidelines_Booklet_Final.pdf; COLORADO DEP’T OF
EDUC., NUTRITIOUS SCHOOL VENDING: STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO IMPLEMENTING COLORADO
SENATE BILL 04-103 (2004), available at http://www.cde.state.co.us/cdenutritran/download/
pdf/VendingGuide.pdf.
199. Sometimes a champion legislator might follow up with a mandatory bill, but not always.
200. See, e.g., S.B. 437, 423d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2005), available at http://www.mlis.
state.md.us/2005rs/bills/sb/sb0473f.pdf; S.B. 860, 73d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005).
201. In an email exchange a local district food service director clarified to a local school
advocate in Kansas exactly what the state required of districts, given that the Kansas State
Department of Education (KSDE) has model guidelines on their website, but the bill language
does not require schools to act. Here is the director’s reply: “KSDE developed model policy
guidelines, but it’s up to each individual school district to develop their own policy . . . . Each
district has the option to choose the model, which has different levels (Basic, Advanced and
Exemplary). It’s confusing, I know.” E-mail from Cindy Foley, Food Service Director, Salina
Kansas Public Schools, to Bette Sue, local school advocate in Kansas, (Dec. 19, 2006, 12:00 CST)
(on file with the Duke Law Journal).
202. See Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-265, § 204,
118 Stat. 729, 780–81 (2004).
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Curiously, Congress did allocate four million dollars to the USDA for
implementation, to be used for “technical assistance . . . for guidance
purposes only and not to be construed as binding or as a mandate to
203
schools.”
For example, the USDA’s Team Nutrition website includes a
plethora of materials, including sample guidelines that come with the
following disclaimer: “These examples are being provided as
204
references. USDA is not promoting one over another.” On a very
long webpage called “The Local Process: How to Create and
Implement a Local Wellness Policy,” the USDA lists no fewer than
eight steps, under each of which are many more steps and links to
205
numerous resources.
How are the wellness policies going? It may be too soon to tell,
but there are early signs of challenges. According to one survey, only
about half of all approved policies met even the minimum guidelines
required by statute. Moreover, 40 percent of the policies did not
specify who was in charge of implementation, and few indicated any
206
timeline or measurable objectives. Another survey showed that
although most wellness policies addressed nutrition standards for
competitive foods, only 16 percent of districts laid out
“prescriptive/specific nutrition standards for [à] la carte and
vending.”207
What are some of the specific challenges that schools are facing
in complying with the federal wellness policy mandate? The Illinois
State Board of Education went so far as to write an entire report on
this very issue, listing no fewer than twenty-seven barriers identified
by members of the School Wellness Policy Task Force. Topping the
list of barriers to implementation were (1) the distraction of other
priorities, such as No Child Left Behind requirements; (2) lack of
203. § 204(b)(2)–(3), 118 Stat. at 781.
204. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Food & Nutrition Serv., Examples: Local Wellness Policy,
http://www.fns.usda.gov/tn/Healthy/wellnesspolicy_examples.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2007).
205. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Food & Nutrition Serv., The Local Process: How to Create and
Implement a Local Wellness Policy, http://www.fns.usda.gov/tn/Healthy/wellnesspolicy_
steps.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2007).
206. See Press Release, Action for Healthy Kids, Study Finds that Half of Local Wellness
Policies Fall Short of Federally Mandated Requirements 1 (Aug. 21, 2006), available at
http://www.actionforhealthykids.org/filelib/pr/WP%20preview%20release%208-21-06.pdf.
207. SCH. NUTRITION ASS’N, A FOUNDATION FOR THE FUTURE II: ANALYSIS OF LOCAL
WELLNESS POLICIES FROM 140 SCHOOL DISTRICTS IN 49 STATES 8 (2006), available at
http://www.schoolnutrition.org/uploadedFiles/SchoolNutrition.org/News_&_Publications/School
_Foodservice_News/New_Folder/Regional%20LWP%20Report.pdf.
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resources, including time, staff, and money; and (3) fear of losing
208
revenue. Although some of these barriers, such as increased
standardized testing, may be new, most of these arguments were
raised in one form or another whenever attempts were made to curb
sales of competitive junk foods in schools.
Even if schools can overcome these barriers to put a wellness
policy in place, there are still many questions regarding enforcement.
A representative of the Illinois Association of Regional School
Superintendents and a member of the statewide task force (the body
charged with oversight of the local wellness policies) admitted, “It’s
209
unclear how this is ever going to be enforced.”
There are other signs that schools are too afraid of losing
revenue to enact truly meaningful policies. For example, the
Monongalia County Board of Education in West Virginia passed a
school wellness policy without recommending a ban on candy sales at
fundraisers because “it could hurt school groups’ ability to raise
money for uniforms and equipment.”210 The school board president
argued that even if schools did not sell it, candy would still be
available elsewhere, and it is “important for the school district to
offer more chances for kids to get exercise after school.”211 Another
board member said that districts should not dictate these policies, and
“schools should make those decisions on a more local level.”212 So the
debate over local control has gone from the federal level to the state
level, down even to the district level. Once again, disingenuous
arguments over local control and exercise are deployed when the real
concern is loss of funding. And although some arguments never
appear to change, there is no denying that children’s health has
indeed changed—and for the worse.

208. ILL. STATE BD. OF EDUC., REPORT ON BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTING SCHOOL
WELLNESS POLICIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO REDUCE THOSE BARRIERS, S. 162, 95th
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2006), at 7–11, available at http://www.isfsa.net/Wellness%20
Policy%20Report%20Draft%202.pdf.
209. Madhu Krishnamurthy, District Calls on Parents: Lake Zurich Schools Puts Onus on
Parents to Keep its Students Healthy, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Oct. 30, 2006, at 1.
210. Eric Bowen, BOE Sours on Candy Ban, DOMINION POST (Morgantown, W.Va.), Nov.
15, 2006, at A1.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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B. Case Study in Local Control: Los Angeles
What does history show about the ability of local school districts
to create lasting change? The history of competitive foods in Los
Angeles is the quintessential example of an urban school district
acting to ban competitive junk food sales in the interest of student
health, only to find its best intentions undone by a lack of consistent
federal or state nutrition policy and the lack of adequate funding for
schools at every level.
Los Angeles schools have grappled since the 1960s with candy
fundraisers and competitive sales of junk food and soda.213 The district
has at times withstood opposition to grassroots activism that
supported a ban on competitive food sales when meaningful federal
regulatory action was thwarted by industry interests,214 and at other
times it has jettisoned junk food restrictions in response to financial
215
pressures. The decades-long debates over competitive food sales
echo debates in school districts across the country; all arguments for
and against competitive food sales have been dissected. The primary
distinction is scale; unlike Los Angeles, most districts are not debating
lost NSLP or competitive food sales in the millions of dollars.216
Otherwise, the impact of junk food sales on student health and school
coffers is the same everywhere. Most startling is the timelessness of
the arguments, which have changed little in the course of forty plus
years. For example, California’s Health and Welfare Secretary in
1975 proposed a soft drink tax of 4.5¢ per six-pack as part of a
program that would “include advertising to discourage the purchase
of ‘non-nutritious, sugar-dominated products’ and a ban on ‘junk
foods’ in school.”217 The collected funds were intended to fight dental
decay.218
Federal actions in the 1970s that sought to regulate FMNV had a
positive impact on Los Angeles and other California schools. One
213. See Snack Bar Enforced to Aid Diets, supra note 15; Sweets in Sylmar: Students Sell
Candy to Help Repay Loans, supra note 70.
214. Robert J. Allan, Most Schools are Scrapping the Sale of Junk Foods, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
29, 1978, at CS1; The Spoon-Feeding of Nonjunk, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1978, at D4.
215. David G. Savage, L.A. Board Lifts Soft Drink Ban, L.A. TIMES, May 14, 1985, at
OC_A8.
216. Los Angeles Schools Lift Junk Food Ban, WASH. POST, May 2, 1990, at A10.
217. Soft Drink Tax for Tooth Care Proposed, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1975, at B36.
218. Id. Calls for taxes on junk foods continue today. See, e.g., Michael F. Jacobson & Kelly
D. Brownell, Small Taxes on Soft Drinks and Snack Foods to Promote Health, 90 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 854 (2000).
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article noted that most schools were “scrapping the sale of junk
219
foods” in anticipation of a federal crackdown. When the USDA
sought to use the regulatory power granted it by Congress, the Los
Angeles Times editorial board voiced concern over student diets
loaded with junk food, but opposed federal interference in local
affairs, stating
We think it’s a bad idea for Washington to spoon-feed such detailed
regulations to schools all over the country . . . . [I]t is not the place of
the Agriculture Department to be telling parents, school
administrators and locally elected school boards how to schedule
their cafeteria operations and vending-machine hours, or how to
220
enforce their rules.
221

Instead, the Times editorial board endorsed grassroots action.
And when federal regulations were limited by court decision, it was
indeed grassroots pressure that overcame opposition based on the
fear of lost revenue. The emphasis on healthier school foods,
however, was short-lived. The subsequent rescissions—first of
restrictions on soda and then of junk food bans—were blamed on
increased financial pressures caused by federal budget cuts. The
burgeoning junk food and soda sales that followed inexorably led to
worsening student health. A 1999 study found that nearly half of
children in low-income schools were obese or overweight, with black
and Latino children particularly hard hit.222 School vending machines
sold mostly junk, and branded fast food was available on à la carte
lines. Any vestiges of nutritional standards policy were “not
universally enforced.”223
Given the absence of meaningful federal regulatory authority
and the building of national momentum to address children’s
worsening health, Los Angeles school board members, together with
parents and local advocates, worked hard to reestablish nutrition
standards that excluded sodas from schools. In 2002, the board

219.
220.
221.
222.

Allan, supra note 214.
The Spoon-Feeding of Nonjunk, supra note 214.
Id.
CTR. FOR FOOD AND JUSTICE, URBAN & ENVTL. POLICY INST., CHALLENGING THE
SODA COMPANIES: THE LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT SODA BAN 5 (2002),
available at http://departments.oxy.edu/uepi/cfj/publications/Challenging_the_Soda_Companies
.pdf.
223. Id.
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unanimously voted to ban soft drinks in all schools starting in 2004.
Los Angeles had once again taken a leading national role.
Soda-ban organizers, aware of the financial arguments that
ultimately jettisoned previous competitive food restrictions, insisted
this time that health issues be paramount and considered apart from
financial ones and described the need to “break the pernicious link
225
between unhealthy products and supplemental funding for schools.”
They recognized that if fundamental changes in school funding were
not forthcoming, financial pressures could once again lead to the
reintroduction of sodas and junk food.
California enacted statewide laws after Los Angeles acted to ban
soda; those laws, too, are applicable to Los Angeles. Although
competitive food sales per se have not been banned, schools are
acting to replace less nutritious items with more “healthful” ones. It is
unknown if sales of new selections will provide the revenue that
keeps school programs running. Federally mandated local wellness
committees may also provide nutritional standards to keep healthier
options in place, because federal standards are insufficient. But
nutritional standards are only useful when they are consistent and
enforced. Unless all three elements are present—adequate funding,
meaningful nutrition standards at all levels, and enforcement
mechanisms—Los Angeles schools could once again look to
competitive junk food to raise funds. But this time, there will at least
226
be the state laws in place, subject, of course, to enforcement and
potential rescission.
V. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
In trying to solve a public health problem, many policymakers
and well-meaning advocates lack a proper historical perspective. It
can be easy for them to think they are the first ones to discover that a
problem exists and then proceed by forging presumably new
solutions. But as discussed, when it comes to improving school food,
there has hardly been a new challenge, argument, or proposed
strategy.

224. Reuters, L.A. Schools Ban Sodas, CNN.COM, Aug. 27, 2002, http://www.cnn.com/2002/
fyi/teachers.ednews/08/27/la.soda.reut/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2007).
225. Id. at 11.
226. See supra Part III.
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Over the past forty years, public health experts, policymakers,
and parents have grappled with the problem of competitive foods. So
the questions become: How does everyone move forward in a way
that learns from the past and avoids making the same mistakes? How
can policymakers and advocates forge meaningful, long-lasting
changes to ensure the problem does not wind up right back where it
started decade after decade?
A. What Is Different Now?
A critical component going forward is an understanding of what
circumstances have changed and how those changes may influence
policymaking. Although most arguments for and against competitive
foods in schools remain the same, several aspects of the issue have
changed.
•

•

•

•

Children’s Health. Obesity, a very visible condition, has
overtaken dental disease as the primary health issue in the
current debate. Diet-related diseases, especially diabetes,
have skyrocketed among children and can also be visibly
recognized as more students require medication throughout
the school day.
Science. Nutritional science has progressed far beyond what
regulators had available to them when the first FMNV
definitions were established. Studies have increasingly
connected competitive foods in general, and soft drink
consumption in particular, to weight gain and nutritional
deficits.
Marketing. Commercialism in schools has exploded.
“Pouring rights” contracts have not only increased
consumption but also the number of vending machines and
advertisements in all school venues. Fast-food chains serve
branded items in à la carte lines and as a component of
federal meal programs. Although exposure to the full extent
of branded food sales and junk food vending has been
shocking to many parents, it might be the norm.
Advocacy. The Internet allows for stronger coalitionbuilding and information-sharing. Also, government
agencies are able to disseminate nutrition guidelines and
information to schools more efficiently. Reports and studies
are readily available to the public. Litigation, or the threat
of litigation, resonates with the financial sector. Advocates
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empowered by the Internet also are increasingly influencing
industry behavior.
Yet with all of these differences, the questions remain: Will they
make a difference? And what are the best strategies to effect change?
B. Levels of Policymaking
One way to approach the answer is to ask what level—federal,
state, or local—is best for policymaking. Or is it best to have all three
operating at once and just hope that effective policies result? In
considering the best course of action from a public health perspective,
it is usually wisest to have the strongest policy across the board. This
leads us to conclude that federal action is best. Such matters do not
take place in a vacuum, however, and the political context for
policymaking must be considered.
Generally, there is an inverse relationship between feasibility
and effectiveness. Although it may be more effective to set
nationwide nutrition standards (and avoid the chaos that reigns at the
local and state levels), it is also less feasible. A general rule of thumb
is that it is harder politically to get things done at the federal level,
somewhat less hard at the state level, and easiest at the local level.
That is why so many public health advocates are fond of touting local
227
policies as a critical strategy.
But another political challenge raises questions about the
effectiveness of federal policymaking: agency capture. Can the USDA
be expected to set meaningful nutrition standards when the agency
has demonstrated time and again how much corporations influence
228
it? Although it would seem that states are more immune to political
pressures when it comes to the regulatory process, this is not always
true. In Arkansas and Illinois, compromise and politics infused the
229
state regulatory process as well.
What about the local level? Although political lobbyists do not
tend to stalk the hallways of every school in the nation, for many

227. See Randolph Kline et al., Beyond Advertising Controls: Influencing Junk-Food
Marketing and Consumption with Policy Innovations Developed in Tobacco Control, 39 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 603, 610 n.27 (2006) (describing the “broad powers enjoyed by public health
officials” as delegated to local governments).
228. See generally, NESTLE, supra note 37 (positing that the food industry provides sufficient
political pressure to influence legislation about nutrition and health).
229. See supra Part III.A.
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230
231
years they have shown up at strategic school board meetings.
Local businesses may curry favor simply as community members.
Also, other challenges remain at the local level, particularly
persuading school principals and other administrators who are so
reliant on the money.
232
In their article Bottom-Up Federalism, Professors Charles
Shipan and Craig Volden analyzed tobacco-control policymaking to
determine whether local laws increase or decrease the likelihood of
state-level action, a question that surprisingly has not been
thoroughly studied given the overall strategic preference for local
action.233 They found that laws can indeed bubble up or “snowball”
from the local to state level by offering state legislatures success
234
stories on which to build statewide policy. On the other hand, local
policymaking can also operate as a “valve” by taking the pressure to
235
act off the states. This is particularly true in states with large urban
centers, which tend to have the most active policy proponents. It
seems that once a problem is solved in one’s backyard, the incentive
is removed for wider action. Shipan and Volden conclude that it can
go either way, depending on certain key conditions.236 Their
recommendation is that in states without strong local leadership,
policymaking should shift to the state rather than remaining at the
local level.237 This is important because strategic planning is necessary
to halt the scattershot approach happening simultaneously at every
level. In the end, continuing down the current path is likely to remain
ineffective.

230. One New Mexico school administrator complained to Congress in 1973 about the
influence of Coca-Cola representatives on the state school board decision to allow soda vending
machines in New Mexico schools. Plagge Statement, supra note 82, at 11.
231. Lobbyists sent a scientific expert to testify against a soda ban in Philadelphia public
schools; that expert failed to reveal her corporate bias. See SIMON, supra note 155, at 225.
232. Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, Bottom-Up Federalism: The Diffusion of
Antismoking Policies from U.S. Cities to States, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 825 (2006).
233. See id. at 825–26 (“Because studies of the interaction between state and local policies so
far have been limited . . . we currently have no systematic understanding of whether, when, and
how local actions might influence state politics and policy adoptions.”). The authors do say that
states inspire other state action. See id. at 825 (“Political scientists have . . . found evidence of
policies spreading from neighbor to neighbor or across similar states . . . .”).
234. Id. at 826.
235. Id. at 827–28.
236. Id. at 840.
237. Id.
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C. What Are the Goals of Improving the School Food Environment?
One critical question often missing from a discussion of
improving school food is simple: what are the goals? Obviously, goals
must be established to determine the best policy strategies. For
example, if the goal of school nutrition policymaking is to reduce
childhood obesity rates and diet-related disease, is this even
achievable through relatively minor changes to nutrition standards
that are limited to schools? Alternately, if the goal is to reduce
children’s overall exposure to marketing of potentially harmful
products, then an entirely different policy approach is warranted—
one that is advocated by certain groups concerned more broadly with
the commercialization of childhood and its negative impacts.238
With our previous discussion of effectiveness and feasibility in
mind, we offer the following goals for statutory and administrative
policymaking: (1) ensure that schools do not contribute to children’s
exposure to commercialism in general, and specifically to the harmful
marketing messages that come with competitive foods; (2) shore up
the NSLP to be the main provider of truly healthy and appetizing
food to children in schools that choose to participate in that program;
and (3) identify alternative funding mechanisms for school programs
so that once and for all, schools do not remain dependent on the
income from competitive foods. To achieve these goals, we can
envision only one effective policy option.
D. The Ultimate Solution: Ban All Competitive Food Sales
Based on this review of past and current strategies and the
myriad limitations of policymaking going forward, only one option
remains viable from a public health perspective: the complete
elimination of competitive food from schools participating in the
NSLP. That would include à la carte lines, vending, and school stores.
Can this be done legally? Given congressional authority over the

238. Such groups include the Campaign for a Commercial-Free Childhood, Campaign for a
Commercial-Free Childhood Home Page, http://www.commercialexploitation.org (last visited
Apr. 6, 2007), and Commercial Alert, Commercial Alert Home Page, http://www.commercial
alert.org (last visited Apr. 6, 2007), both of whom have taken stronger stands against marketing
to children than other groups such as Action for Healthy Kids, Action for Healthy Kids Home
Page, http://www.actionforhealthykids.org (last visited Apr. 6, 2007), and Center for Science in
the Public Interest, Center for Science in the Public Interest Home Page, http://www.cspinet.org
(last visited Apr. 6, 2007), the later being more concerned about nutrition than commercialism
per se.
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fiscal viability of the NSLP, the answer seems clearly yes. Although
the Harkin bill stops short of complete elimination, it exercises that
authority by imposing nutritional standards on all competitive foods
at all times and places. And it may be the best step forward based on
an application of the feasibility and effectiveness calculus.
Of course, industry and possibly even local school districts may
challenge the complete elimination of competitive foods. Although it
may seem that such a proposal faces insurmountable political hurdles,
ultimately it is unlikely that any alternative policy will achieve
meaningful, long-lasting change. Some may counter that such a
proposal is unrealistic, but why must there be room for compromise
when it comes to children’s health? Even from a practical (rather
than theoretical) viewpoint, how is the alternative—to continue with
past policy models—going to ensure positive outcomes? With an
approach that only tweaks the types of food sold, blatant violations
will continue due to lack of oversight, in addition to potential flipflopping due to political wind-shifting. Although a complete ban does
not necessarily eliminate either of these obstacles, removing vending
machines from schools, for example, is a much easier oversight
mechanism than requiring that the items from by the machines meet
nutritional guidelines. It would also eliminate a primary source of
commercialism. Moreover, setting this high bar at the federal level
would send a clear message on the issue’s importance to every school
239
in the nation.
But removing competitive foods from the picture will not solve
the problem alone. At the same time, the quality of school meals must
improve drastically, for example, by increasing the federal
240
reimbursement rate, which in part will lessen schools’ dependency
on high-fat, low-nutrient commodity foods. Increasing the cost for
those who can afford to pay for lunch should also be considered;
school food services are expected to break even, yet are forced to
undercharge students due to parental resistance. It is time for parents
to accept that the axiom “you get what you pay for” does not stop at
the schoolhouse door.

239. Unfortunately, this proposal will only address those schools that participate in the
NSLP, but this is the majority of public schools, so the potential impact is still significant.
240. Connecticut is currently engaged in a unique experiment in which schools are given an
incentive of 10 cents extra per meal if they adhere to certain guidelines for competitive foods.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-215b (2007).
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Just as importantly, schools need better funding in general.
Parents and advocacy groups do not even attempt the drastic
approach of a complete ban because they often face so much
resistance by school administrators to any proposed policy change
that would cut off a revenue stream. It is not that principals do not
care about children’s health; rather, they have come to rely on
competitive foods for funding, as have parents and students.
Therefore, as long as schools are strapped for cash, the temptation to
allow junk food sales will remain. Even with a federal ban, without
proper oversight it is still possible that schools will defy the law,
unless principals feel they have no need to. Proper funding of
education, including extracurricular activities, is critical to address the
241
economic challenges that schools face on daily basis.
CONCLUSION
Given the practical obstacles to this proposal, it is likely that
various local and state battles will continue. A question remains
about whether the effort expended in the fight to regulate
competitive foods could be displacing other possibly more effective
efforts. Although important, schools ultimately are just one part of
the battle when it comes to improving children’s eating habits and
ensuring good health. Could all the emphasis on schools be coming at
the cost of the proliferation of junk food marketing in other realms?
More and more health organizations are taking strong stands against
the problem of junk food marketing to children in general.242 With
emerging forms of “new media,” schools are hardly the only places
that need strong action. There must be a national conversation about
how best to ensure children’s health, a conversation that embraces
not only the radical improvement of school food, but includes all
unhealthy societal influences that have proven detrimental to
children’s nutritional and developmental well-being.

241. The specific policy approaches to accomplishing this goal are beyond the scope of this
Article.
242. For two recent examples, see AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, CHILDREN, ADOLESCENTS,
AND ADVERTISING (2006), available at http://aappolicy.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/pediat
rics; 118/6/2563.pdf; WORLD HEALTH ORG., MARKETING OF FOOD AND NON-ALCOHOLIC
BEVERAGES TO CHILDREN (2006), available at http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/
publications/Oslo%20meeting%20layout%2027%20NOVEMBER.pdf.

